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UCLA LAW REVIEW

Challenging the “Criminal Alien” Paradigm
Angélica Cházaro
Abstract
Deportation of so-called “criminal aliens” has become the driving force in U.S.
immigration enforcement. The Immigration Accountability Executive Actions of
late 2014 provide the most recent example of this trend. Even for immigrants’ rights
advocates, conventional wisdom holds that if deportations must occur, “criminal aliens”
should be the first to go. A voluminous “crimmigration” scholarship notes the evergrowing entwinement of criminal and immigration enforcement, but does not challenge
this fundamental premise.
This Article calls for a rejection of the formulation of the “criminal alien”—the figure
used to increasingly justify the preservation and expansion of a harmful immigration
regime. It thus defends a normative claim that is starkly at odds with settled assumptions
in advocacy and the literature: Deportations should not be distributed along the lines of
migrant criminality. As a consequence, this Article argues that scholarship and advocacy
should embrace “criminal aliens” as the priority group to defend against immigration
enforcement efforts.
This move is long overdue. Across the political spectrum, calls are being made to trim
back the excesses of the criminal justice system, with both policing and incarceration
practices suffering from crises of legitimacy. Yet the immigration system continues
to layer the shortcomings and dysfunctions of the criminal justice system onto
immigration enforcement efforts. The latest immigration reform effort, in the form
of the Immigration Accountability Executive Actions, refines what it means to be a
“criminal alien,” thereby expanding partnerships with the criminal justice system and
creating stronger nets of social control over broad swaths of the noncitizen population.
While offering the possibility of relief from deportation to part of the undocumented
population, the Executive Actions ultimately do not curb deportations. Rather, the
programs refocus enforcement efforts on an ideologically acceptable target: the “criminal
alien.” To avoid this outcome, and to begin to dismantle immigrant vulnerability, the
“criminal alien” paradigm must be challenged.
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INTRODUCTION
On November 20, 2014, after months of delays, President Obama announced the “Immigration Accountability Executive Actions,” a series of administrative reforms to the immigration system. These reforms included expanded
protections from deportations—in the form of renewable “deferred action”1—
for certain segments of the unauthorized migrant population.2 The response
was swift and immediate. Opponents decried the “imperial presidency” and
denounced the action as “executive amnesty.”3 Immigrants and their supporters
celebrated the expansion of protection but criticized the President for not going
far enough.4

1.
2.
3.

4.

See infra Part I.C for a full discussion of the deferred action programs created by the Executive.
President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Immigration
(Nov. 20, 2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/20/remarks-president-addr
ess-nation-immigration [http://perma.cc/RUQ8-4VSN].
Eli Saslow, Conservative Expert on Immigration Law to Pursue Suit Against Executive Action, WASH.
POST (Nov. 22, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/2014/11/22/f6d2b3fe-728a11e4-ad12-3734c461eab6_story.html [http://perma.cc/R63B-FN3Z] (describing Kansas Secretary
of State Kris Kobach characterizing the executive action as “[i]mperial, executive amnesty,” and
“[t]he sacrificial shredding of our Constitution.”); see also Ross Douthat, The Making of an Imperial
President, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/23/opinion/sunday/
ross-douthat-the-making-of-an-imperial-president.html [http://perma.cc/PB4B-6PEH] (claiming
that the Obama Administration has become the type of imperial executive President Obama decried
during his campaign).
See, e.g., Gustavo Bonilla, Obama’s Executive Order on Immigration May Not Go Far Enough for
My Family, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/20
14/nov/20/obamas-executive-order-on-immigration-not-far-enough [http://perma.cc/67T9-K
ZUM] (arguing that the announced Executive Actions on Immigration will not counteract
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) deadlines for deportation and voluntary
removal); see also Tim Gaynor, Relief or tears as Obama’s reform touch Arizona immigrant families,
ALJAZEERA AM. (Nov. 21, 2014). http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/11/21/obama-imm
igrationarizon awatchpartyreaction. html [http://perma.cc/2YER-8U9D] (“We were really, really
hopeful that everyone was going to benefit from this and unfortunately that’s not the case.”);
Michael Larkin & John Cádiz Klemack, SoCal Undocumented Immigrants Say Obama’s Immigration
Overhaul Does Not Go Far Enough, NBC L.A. (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.nbclosangeles.com/
news/local/SoCal-Undocumented-Immigrants-Say-President-Obamas-Immigration-OverhaulDoes-Not-Go-Far-Enough-283457871.html [http://perma.cc/B45Z-343P] (describing the
disappointment of undocumented parents and children that, even with the Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals (DACA) executive action in place, they are “still at risk to be deported”);
Michael D. Shear, Obama, Daring Congress, Acts to Overhaul Immigration, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/21/us/obama-immigration-speech.html [http://perma.
cc/G6MD-4VT4] (“Immigration advocates and the president’s Democratic allies hailed the
announcement even as they insisted that more should be done to provide legal protections for
millions of unauthorized immigrants unaffected by Mr. Obama’s directives.”).
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Nestled in one of the eleven memoranda simultaneously released by the
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) that established the
parameters of the Executive Actions5 was the “significant misdemeanor,” a category of criminal offenses established as one of the new priorities for immigration enforcement efforts.6 It transforms noncitizens convicted of a series of
petty offenses, including a single driving under the influence (DUI), into so-called
“criminal aliens,”7 and directs immigration enforcement agencies to prioritize
their arrest, imprisonment, and deportation8 (formally known as removal).9
The inclusion of the significant misdemeanor in the Executive Actions as
a mechanism for facilitating deportations represents just one of the latest manifestations in a growing trend: deportation of “criminal aliens” as the driving force in
U.S. immigration enforcement.10 The contents of the Executive Actions reflect
the broadly accepted wisdom that, if deportations must occur, “criminal aliens”
should be the first to go.11 Thus, the Executive Actions form part and parcel of the
constant growth of immigration-related practices and activities that can be categorized as criminal.12 Even immigration scholars who have carefully and insightfully
5.
6.

7.

8.

9.
10.
11.

12.

See U.S. DEP’T. HOMELAND SEC., FIXING OUR BROKEN IMMIGRATION SYSTEM THROUGH
EXECUTIVE ACTION—KEY FACTS, (Jan. 5, 2015), http://www.dhs.gov/immigration-action
[http://perma.cc/REK7-4CTH].
See Memorandum from Jeh C. Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Thomas S.
Winkowski, Acting Dir. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, R. Gil Kerlikowske, Comm’r, U.S.
Customs & Border Prot., Leon Rodriguez, Dir. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Alan D.
Bersin, Acting Assistant Sec’y for Pol'y 4 (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/
files/publications/14_1120_memo_prosecutorial_discretion.pdf [http://perma.cc/RCY5-6VGF]
[hereinafter Priorities Memo]; infra Part I.A for a full discussion of the significant misdemeanor.
Throughout the text, I will use the term "criminal alien" in quotes, unless I am referring to the
criminal alien category. The Article seeks to problematize the unquestioning use of the concept
of the "criminal alien" to guide immigration law and policy, and the use of quotes contributes to
that goal.
I will use the colloquial term “deportation” throughout the Article to refer to the process of removal.
Removal is the legal term for the formal expulsion of a noncitizen from the United States when the
noncitizen has been found removable for violating the immigration laws. Prior to 1997 deportation
and exclusion were separate removal procedures. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration
Responsibility Act consolidated these procedures into one removal function. Deportation continues
to be used outside the immigration legal context to refer to removal, and I adopt that term
throughout.
Priorities Memo, supra note 6, at 2.
See Ingrid V. Eagly, Criminal Justice for Noncitizens: An Analysis of Variation in Local Enforcement, 88
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1126, 1128 (2013).
See, e.g., President Barack Obama, supra note 2 (“That’s why, over the past six years, deportations of
criminals are up 80 percent. And that’s why we’re going to keep focusing enforcement resources on
actual threats to our security. Felons, not families. Criminals, not children. Gang members, not a
mom who’s working hard to provide for her kids. We’ll prioritize, just like law enforcement does
every day.”).
See Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal
Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 472 (2007) (arguing that the “theories, methods,
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dissected the links between the criminal and immigration system stop short of
making the normative claim that deportations should not be distributed along the
lines of migrant criminality.13 Kevin R. Johnson’s insight that “the ‘criminal alien’
continues to be one of the most reviled characters of all of U.S. law, with many enemies and extremely few political friends (even among immigrant rights advocates),” continues to ring true.14
This Article challenges the accepted wisdom, arguing for the necessity of
dismantling the category of criminal alien as a vector for the harms of immigration
enforcement. It does so by analyzing the 2014 Immigration Accountability Executive Actions, positing that the actions represent neither the amnesty decried by
critics nor the curb to deportations hoped for by advocates. Instead, by widening
who is considered a “criminal alien,” the Executive Actions represent a moment of
expansion and consolidation of harmful systems targeting immigrant communities.
The fact that the deportation of “criminal aliens” has become the driving
force in U.S. immigration enforcement has led at least one scholar to declare federal immigration enforcement a “criminal removal system.”15 This system requires
the constant production of populations who can be labeled “criminal aliens” and
thus be justifiably arrested, detained, and deported. Given its reliance on the criminal system, this production of “criminal aliens” occurs along lines of race,16 class,17
and other vectors of social vulnerability.18 This places immigration enforcement

13.

14.
15.
16.

17.
18.

perceptions, and priorities” of the criminal justice system have been incorporated into the immigration
enforcement system).
See, e.g., Jennifer M. Chacón, Overcriminalizing Immigration, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
613, 614 (2013) (tracking major developments in immigration law and immigration enforcement
that have led to criminalization of immigrants); Legomsky, supra note 12, at 469 (arguing that the
“theories, methods, perceptions, and priorities” of the criminal justice system have been incorporated
into the immigration enforcement system.); Teresa A. Miller, Citizenship & Severity: Recent
Immigration Reforms and the New Penology, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611 (2003) (describing the
criminalization of immigration law through law enforcement-focused reforms).
Kevin R. Johnson, Ten Guiding Principles for Truly Comprehensive Immigration Reform: A Blueprint,
55 WAYNE L. REV. 1599, 1607 (2009).
See Eagly, supra note 10, at 1128.
See Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, Undocumented Criminal Procedure, 58 UCLA L. REV.
1543, 1549 (2011) (arguing that the Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio and United States v. BrignoniPonce effectively enables procedural racial profiling); see also Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation’s Last
Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1
(1998) (analyzing the Plenary Power Doctrine and its application against Asian and African
Americans).
See Yolanda Vásquez, Perpetuating the Marginalization of Latinos: A Collateral Consequence of the
Incorporation of Immigration Law into the Criminal Justice System, 54 HOW. L.J. 639, 666–67 (2011).
See Pooja Gehi, Gendered (In)security: Migration and Criminalization in the Security State, 35 HARV.
J.L. & GENDER 357, 385 (2012) (analyzing Secure Communities (S-Comm)’s disparate impact on
queer and transgender undocumented communities).
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firmly in line with the practices and activities of the criminal justice system.19
This Article examines the Executive Actions in this light, revealing them as part
of a broader thrust not to curb detentions and deportations, but to redirect them
toward a more ideologically acceptable set of targets: so-called “criminal aliens.”
The ongoing legal battle over whether certain parts of the Executive Actions
will be implemented only serves to mask the preservation of practices that lead to
record levels of immigration enforcement. The possible extension of deferred action (protection from deportation) to unauthorized migrants who arrived in the
United States as children, and to unauthorized migrant who are parents of U.S.
citizens (the two categories included in the Executive Actions’ protections), is currently being contested in the courts. Twenty-six states sued to stop its implementation,20 and the Obama Administration and immigrant advocates are strenuously
defending it.21 This legal battle, which falls primarily on partisan lines, obscures
the fact that expanding deferred action would not lead to a corresponding decrease
in deportations. If deferred action is ultimately implemented, those who do not
qualify for its protections will receive the full brunt of DHS’s immigration enforcement efforts. The legal battle also ignores that, if deferred action is implemented, the capture of applicants’ biometrics data and the permanent storage of
this data in the immigration database relied upon by DHS’s enforcement agencies
to apprehend, detain, and deport those who come into contact with the criminal
system would mark deferred action applicants as “criminal aliens”-in-waiting.22
Thus, even recipients of deferred action would be only one police stop away from
being labeled “criminal aliens,” targeted for immigration enforcement practices.
This Article seeks to unmask these practices and examine how the United
States has reduced the response to the social crisis of unauthorized migration to
the logics of criminality and expulsion. These logics are grounded in narratives
that pit worthy (hardworking, family-oriented) immigrants against unworthy
(criminal alien) immigrants.23 The President’s insistence that the Executive Ac-

19.
20.
21.

22.
23.

See Mary Bosworth & Emma Kaufman, Foreigners in a Carceral Age: Immigration and Imprisonment
in the United States, 22 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 429 (2011).
Order of Temporary Injunction, Texas v. United States, No. B-14-254 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 16, 2015),
http://www.scribd.com/doc/255992850/Order-of-Temporary-Injunction-Texas-v-United-States
(order granting temporary injunction of implementation of executive action).
See Katie Zezima, Obama: ‘We Will Be as Aggressive as We Can’ on Immigration Appeal, WASH.
POST. (Feb. 25, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2015/02/25/oba
ma-meets-with-immigration-activists-ahead-of-florida-town-hall [http://perma.cc/PRX7L9WG]
(advocates and President Obama prepare to “aggressively” defend the new deferred action program
enjoined by the Texas District Court).
See infra Part I.C for a full discussion of the biometrics requirement and its possible consequences.
See Elizabeth Keyes, Defining American: The DREAM Act, Immigration Reform and Citizenship, 14
NEV. L.J. 101, 112 (2013).
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tions seek to target immigration enforcement against “felons, not families” places it squarely within these narratives.24 By playing into these false binaries, the
Executive Actions appear designed to teach us how to abandon entire populations through consolidating and strengthening of the criminal alien category.25
This Article proposes new terms of engagement, building on, but departing from, the existing literature on the intersections of criminal and immigration
law and policy. It builds on scholarship addressing the shortcomings of the
criminal justice system, arguing that any attempt to avoid further consolidation
of the criminal alien category requires an engagement with the crisis of legitimacy currently facing the criminal system. While many have used the language of
“collateral consequences” to acknowledge the disparate impact on those persons
caught between the criminal and immigration regimes,26 this Article engages
with the way the dysfunctions of the criminal system are overlaid on the immigration system to create cumulative consequences for those whose identity
marks them as both criminal and alien.
The Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I analyzes three of the Executive
Actions memoranda released on November 20, 2014.27 It argues that the
memorandum entitled, “Policies for the Apprehension, Detention and Removal of Undocumented Immigrants” (Priorities Memo), which redefined what
segments of the noncitizen population constitute priorities for immigration
enforcement, ultimately developed new mechanisms to facilitate the arrest and
detention of undocumented immigrants.28 It finds that the Secure Communities Memorandum (Secure Communities Memo), which announced the creation

24.

25.
26.

27.

28.

President Barack Obama, supra note 2; see also President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President
on Immigration (Nov. 21, 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/21/
remarks-president-immigration [http://perma.cc/BZS8-47PB] [hereinafter Nov. 21, 2014 Obama
Remarks] (“We’ll keep focusing enforcement resources on actual threats to our security. But that
means felons, not families.”).
Lisa Marie Cacho, The Rights of Respectability: Ambivalent Allies, Reluctant Rivals, and Disavowed
Deviants, in IMMIGRANT RIGHTS IN THE SHADOWS OF CITIZENSHIP 190, 199 (Rachel Ida Buff
ed., 2008).
Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Consequences of
Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 703–04 (2002) (explaining the collateral consequences rule
and observing that courts have not explained how the rule “fits into the system for evaluating claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel”).
While eleven memoranda were released as part of the Executive Actions, this Article focuses on the
three that arguably have the biggest impact on unauthorized migrant populations currently living in
the United States: “Policies for the Apprehension, Detention and Removal of Undocumented
Immigrants” (Priorities Memo, supra note 6), the Secure Communities Memo (infra note 29), and
“Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as
Children and with Respect to Certain Individuals Who Are the Parents of U.S. Citizens or
Permanent Residents” (Deferred Action Memo, infra note 30).
See Priorities Memo, supra note 6.
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of the Priority Enforcement Program (PEP) simply rebranded, rather than replaced, Secure Communities (S-Comm)—a predecessor program that established
full information sharing between local law enforcement and federal immigration
officials.29 Finally, through an analysis of the Deferred Action Memorandum
(Deferred Action Memo)—the memorandum that lays out the parameters of the
new extended forms of deferred action for childhood arrivals and parents of U.S.
citizens and Lawful Permanent Residents—Part I examines the ideological justifications for protecting certain sectors of the undocumented population from detention and deportation, while hypercriminalizing the rest.30 In Part II, the Article
lays out how the three memos contribute to the phenomenon known as net widening—creating wider, stronger, and different nets of social control over broad
swaths of the noncitizen population.31 It also examines how the rhetoric that attempts to differentiate immigrants from so-called real criminals contributes to net
widening and inadvertently shores up the ever-expanding category of criminal alien as one suitable for the distribution of the harms of detention and deportation.
Part III argues that in order to avoid future cycles of refinement and expansion of
criminal enforcement efforts, advocates and scholars must fully grapple with notions of migrant criminality and criminality in general, in an effort to dismantle
the distribution of harms based on being a “criminal alien.” Ultimately, by examining the Executive Actions through the lens of the “criminal alien,” this Article seeks to both shape how scholars conceptualize the continual expansion of this
category and encourage immigrant advocates to invest in strategies that can halt
this expansion and begin its downfall.

29.

30.

31.

See Memorandum from Jeh C. Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. on Secure
Communities to Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, Megan
Mack, Officer, Off. of Civil Rights & Civil Liberties & Phillip A. McNamara, Assistant Sec’y,
Intergovernmental Affairs (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_
1120_memo_secure_communities.pdf [http://perma.cc/U4TU-U2WA] [hereinafter “Secure
Communities Memo”].
See Memorandum from Jeh C. Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. on Exercising
Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children
and With Respect to Certain Individuals Who Are the Parents of U.S. Citizens or Permanent
Residents, to León Rodriguez, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Thomas S.
Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t & R. Gil Kelikowske, Comm’r, U.S.
Customs & Border Prot. (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_
1120_memo_deferred_action.pdf [http://perma.cc/8B9C-6QZN] [hereinafter the “Deferred
Action Memo”].
See James Austin & Barry Krisberg, Wider, Stronger, and Different Nets: The Dialectics of Criminal
Justice Reform, 18 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 165, 169 (1981) (“The criminal justice system can be
conceptualized as a net or series of nets functioning to regulate and control personal behavior. Each
component of the justice system . . . is authorized by the state to intervene in our personal lives.”).
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I.

THE EXECUTIVE ACTIONS MEMORANDA

A.

The Priorities Memo

1.

The Creation of the Significant Misdemeanor

In June 2012, the Secretary of DHS announced the creation of Deferred
Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), a program that offered a reprieve from
deportation for eligible unauthorized migrants who had arrived in the United
States as children.32 Applications for DACA are processed by U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration Service (USCIS), the federal agency charged with administering
immigration benefits.33 Those who qualify receive a renewable employment authorization document and reprieve from deportation for two years.34 DACA represents a victory for immigrant youth who had been organizing for reform;35
recipients of DACA are able to receive social security numbers, and in some
states driver’s licenses or other forms of formal identification.36 Although DACA

32.

33.
34.
35.

36.

See Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., on Exercising
Prosecutorial Discretion With Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children,
to David V. Aguilar, Acting Comm'r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., Alejandro Mayorakas, Dir.,
U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs. & John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t
(June 15, 2012), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-indivi
duals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf [http://perma.cc/F7JG-SP5R] [hereinafter June 15, 2012
Discretion Memo].
See About Us, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/aboutus [http://perma.
cc/92X8-KU68] (last visited Jan. 5, 2016).
See General Information: How Do I Request Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals?,
U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. 2 (Oct. 2013), http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/
USCIS/Resources/daca.pdf [http://perma.cc/Y3Z8-7UXP].
See Miriam Jordan, Anatomy of a Deferred-Action Dream: How Undocumented Youth Brought Their
Cause to the Country, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 14, 2012), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100008723963
90443982904578046951916986168 [http://perma.cc/EL4R-JN7R] (Describing marches and
protests in Miami, Washington D.C., and Los Angeles, including the 1,500 mile “Trail of
Dreams” where four youths marched from Miami to Washington, D.C. to promote the DREAM
Act); see also Lauren Gilbert, Obama’s Ruby Slippers: Enforcement Discretion in the Absence of
Immigration Reform, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 255, 271–72 (2013) (describing the organization of
DREAMers into the United We Dream organization preceding the 2010 election season, rallying
in public events, and publicizing their opposition to the Obama Administration absent more
promises from the Administration).
Kari E. D’Ottavio, Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals: Why Granting Driver’s Licenses to DACA
Beneficiaries Makes Constitutional and Political Sense, 72 MD. L. REV. 931, 934 (2013) (“The majority
of states . . . confirmed that DACA beneficiaries were eligible for driver’s licenses.”); see also Access to
Driver’s Licenses for Immigrant Youth Granted DACA, NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CTR. 1 (May 31, 2015),
http://www.nilc.org/document.html?id=1120 [http://perma.cc/M7YQ-X444] (last updated May
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is restricted to a particular population, for those who do qualify, the downsides
appear to be few.37 DACA seems to be a limited, but nonetheless significant
achievement.
Not all undocumented immigrant youth qualify for DACA, however. The
application form inquires about criminal history, and the instructions, as well as
USCIS’s guidance on DACA, clarify that a broad range of criminal convictions
will disqualify applicants.38 This in itself is not unusual; every application for immigration relief inquires about criminal history. In creating the application process for DACA, however, DHS created a new crime-based category disqualifying
applicants for the immigration benefit—the significant misdemeanor.39 The category had no statutory basis and was a wholesale invention of the Executive
Branch.
The instructions for DACA define the significant misdemeanor as an
offense of domestic violence; sexual abuse or exploitation; burglary; unlawful
possession or use of a firearm; drug distribution or trafficking; or driving under the influence; or one for which the individual was sentenced to time in
custody of 90 days or more (not including a suspended sentence). The instructions for DACA further add that anyone convicted of three or more
misdemeanors not arising out of the same incident is also disqualified from
applying for the program.40
In the rush to celebrate the win, and to mobilize resources to assist potential
DACA recipients in submitting their applications, little attention was paid by
immigration advocates to the emergence of this new category. Attorneys who
specialize in the intersection of criminal and immigration law did create advisories and trainings for public defenders who now had to understand the significant

37.
38.

39.
40.

31, 2015) (“[O]therwise-eligible DACA recipients who obtain an employment authorization
document and a Social Security number are now able to obtain a license in every state”).
See Deferred Action Memo, supra note 30, at 2–3.
See Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR.
SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/consideration-deferred-action-childhood-arrivals-daca
#national-security [http://perma.cc/WKA3-EWP8] (last updated Aug. 3, 2015) (conviction of a
felony offense, significant misdemeanor offense, or three or more other misdemeanor offenses not
occurring on the same date and not arising out of the same act, omission, or scheme of misconduct
precludes DACA consideration); see also Priorities Memo, supra note 6, at 4 (categorizing the
second-highest priority individuals for deportation for ICE: “aliens convicted of a ‘significant
misdemeanor,’ which for these purposes is an offense of domestic violence; sexual abuse or
exploitation; burglary; unlawful possession or use of a firearm; drug distribution or trafficking; or
driving under the influence; or if not an offense listed above, one for which the individual was
sentenced to time in custody of 90 days or more (the sentence must involve time to be served in
custody, and does not include a suspended sentence) . . . .”).
Priorities Memo, supra note 6, at 4.
Id. at 3–4.
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misdemeanor in order to properly advise their noncitizen clients on the immigration consequences of their criminal matters.41 For the most part, however, the
category remained mostly ignored and undertheorized. For two and a half years,
the significant misdemeanor existed only as a disqualifying corollary to an application for a nonstatus (deferred action) that was meant to be a temporary fix while
Congress passed lasting immigration reform.
2.

The Reemergence of the Significant Misdemeanor

On November 20, 2014, the significant misdemeanor made its first
appearance outside the DACA application context when President Obama announced a new round of executive actions on immigration that expanded on the
2012 announcement of DACA.42 These “Immigration Accountability Executive Actions” were accompanied by DHS’s simultaneous release of a series of
memoranda laying out proposed reforms to the immigration enforcement system.43 The memos were directives from DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson to the various directors of DHS’s subagencies charged with managing immigration benefits
and enforcement.44 This Part focuses on the Executive Action memorandum referred to as the Priorities Memo and the reintroduction of the significant misdemeanor category in this context.45
The Priorities Memo establishes three categories of unauthorized migrants
who will henceforth be considered priorities for the immigration enforcement efforts carried out by both Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and
Customs and Border Protection (CBP)—the DHS agencies charged with internal immigration enforcement and enforcement of the immigration laws at borders and ports of entry, respectively. The logic undergirding the Priorities Memo
is that the arrest and deportation of the approximately 11 million unauthorized
migrants living in the United States remains unfeasible; the memo states, “[d]ue

41.

42.
43.
44.
45.

See, e.g., Understanding the Criminal Bars to the Deferred Action Policy for Childhood Arrivals,
IMMIGRANT LEGAL RESOURCE CTR. (Oct. 2012), http://www.ilrc.org/files/documents/ilrc-un
derstanding_criminal_bars_to_deferred_action_5.pdf [http://perma.cc/F4YG-6AS3]; see also
Practice Advisory: Identifying and Keeping Client’s Eligible for the New “Deferred Action for Childhood
Arrivals (DACA)” Program, WASH. DEF. ASS’N 4 (Sept. 12, 2012), http://www.defensenet.org/
immigration-project/immigration-resources/WDAIP%20Dreamer%20Deferred%20Action%20
Advisory%209-13-2012_final.pdf; see also Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372–75 (2010)
(holding that criminal defense attorneys render ineffective assistance of counsel when they fail to
warn their noncitizen clients of the immigration consequences of certain pleas).
See President Barack Obama, supra note 2.
See U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., supra note 5.
Id.
Priorities Memo, supra note 6.
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to limited resources, DHS and its Components cannot respond to all immigration violations or remove all persons illegally in the United States.”46 Thus, the
Memo outlines priority categories to assist ICE and CBP agents in deciding
whether to place an individual in removal (deportation) proceedings, as well as
aid agents in deciding “whom to stop, question, and arrest; whom to detain or
release; whether to settle, dismiss, appeal or join in a motion or cause; and whether
to grant deferred action, parole or a stay of removal instead of pursuing removal in
a case.”47
The Memo defines the top priority for these efforts, Priority 1, as “threats to
national security, border security, and public safety,” with terrorism suspects, individuals caught crossing the border unlawfully, gang members, and convicted
felons constituting groups who “must be prioritized” for removal.48 The Memo
labels “misdemeanants and new immigration violators” as Priority 2, the group
that represents the “second-highest priority for apprehension and removal.”49
Subsection (a) of Priority 2 lists individuals with three or more misdemeanor
convictions, and subsection (b) lists “aliens convicted of a ‘significant misdemeanor’” as individuals who “should be removed.”50 Priority 3 names those
who have been issued an order of removal after January 1, 2014, as the final, and
lowest-priority, enforcement priority category.51
The Priority Memo’s addition of the significant misdemeanor to an enforcement-related document is a notable development. The significant misdemeanor category did not exist before the June 2012 creation of DACA—a program
that was ostensibly created to protect the most respectable and sympathetic among
unauthorized migrants in the United States, those who came to this country as
children.52 DACA was created with the stated purpose of offering deportation
relief to this population. With the significant misdemeanor making the leap
from a program that offered deportation relief in 2012 to the Priorities Memo in
2014, the act of curbing deportation becomes directly linked to the expansion of
the categorical criminalization of immigrants.
This link is heightened by the appearance of the significant misdemeanor in
two other 2014 Executive Actions memoranda. The Secure Communities
Memo, discussed in detail in Part I.B, infra, names significant misdemeanants as
among the category of noncitizens whose transfer immigration officials should
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 2.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id. at 3–4.
Id. at 4.
See June 15, 2012 Discretion Memo, supra note 32.
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seek from local law enforcement directly to federal immigration agency custody (and probable detention and removal).53 Additionally, in the Deferred Action Memo, discussed in detail in Part I.C, the significant misdemeanor appears as
a disqualifying factor for the expanded form of DACA, and for Deferred Action
for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA).54
The 2014 Executive Actions came about after advocates pushed the President to use his authority to curb the record levels of deportations.55 The creation
of DAPA and expanded DACA did expand the charmed circle of those who
would not be subject to deportation. With the inclusion of the significant misdemeanor in the Priorities Memo, however, the very category used to disqualify
some from protection for deportation would also render them targets for enforcement efforts. With the consolidation of the significant misdemeanor category
as a priority category for enforcement efforts, deportations, rather than being
curbed as advocates sought, will likely just be redirected toward newly named categories of criminal aliens.
3.

The Significant Misdemeanor in Context

The creation of the significant misdemeanor category, and the accompanying prioritization of unauthorized migrants with misdemeanor convictions
for deportation, constitute only the latest example of the criminal justice system
merger with immigration enforcement efforts.56 The significant misdemeanor
joins the pantheon of categories, including the aggravated felony and the crime
involving moral turpitude, that for over a century have served as grounds for
triggering immigration enforcement action, as well as for disqualifying immigrants for lawful admission into the United States and for deporting long-term
residents of the United States.57 This forms part of the context for the rhetoric
on display in the President’s speech announcing the Executive Actions:

53.
54.
55.

56.
57.

See Secure Communities Memo, supra note 29.
See Deferred Action Memo, supra note 30.
See, e.g., The Editorial Board, Yes He Can, on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2014), http://www.
nytimes.com/2014/04/06/opinion/sunday/yes-he-can-on-immigration.html [http://perma.cc/B458
-AVCK] (decrying unprecedented levels of deportation under the Obama Administration,
endorsing the Not One More campaign, and calling for the removal of quota-based deportation
programs, an end to Secure Communities, and an extension of sympathetic programs like the
DREAM Act to other vulnerable undocumented groups).
See Chacón, supra note 13.
See Miller, supra note 13 (describing the criminalization of immigration law through law
enforcement-focused reforms); see also Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime,
and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 407–09 (2006) (describing the historical movement
from crimes of “moral turpitude” to a wider variety of crimes that trigger deportation proceedings).
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Undocumented workers broke our immigration laws, and I believe
that they must be held accountable—especially those who may be
dangerous. That’s why, over the past six years, deportations of criminals are up 80 percent. And that’s why we’re going to keep focusing
enforcement resources on actual threats to our security. Felons, not
families. Criminals, not children. Gang members, not a mother who's
working hard to provide for her kids. We’ll prioritize, just like law enforcement does every day . . . . If you meet the criteria, you can come
out of the shadows and get right with the law. If you're a criminal,
you'll be deported.58

While anti-immigrant actors accused the President of going too far in
providing what they termed an “executive amnesty,” immigrant advocates critiqued the “felons, not families” line as overly simplistic, divisive, and dehumanizing.59 When viewed in the context of decades of deployment of categories
like the aggravated felony and crime involving moral turpitude, however, the
rhetoric is unsurprising. The “felons not families” catchphrase reveals the federal
government’s view that a criminal conviction shifts an immigrant’s identity from
a possible parent or worker or child to a body to be processed for detention and
deportation. Immigrants have come to be defined by their contact with the criminal justice system; a noncitizen with a criminal record automatically becomes a
felon indistinguishable from her criminal record.
By including the significant misdemeanor category under Priority 2, the
Priorities Memo clarifies that for the purposes of “focusing enforcement resources on actual threats to our security,” the Executive Branch considers individuals with misdemeanor convictions to be “felons, not families.”60 They are
completely divorced from their familial or community contexts and are not allowed to simultaneously be considered partners, siblings, or parents. Obama’s
repeated invocation of the “felons, not families” line mirrors the reality that an
increasingly broad range of criminal convictions is enough to transform a
noncitizen into a felon—permanently marked as unworthy of membership in
society, and thus a proper target for immigration enforcement efforts.61 The felon category, at least as wielded by Obama in his speeches, has gone far past the
borders of the actual felony conviction in criminal court. As clarified by the Priorities Memo, the individuals newly designated by the Executive Branch as
58.
59.
60.
61.

President Barack Obama, supra note 2; see also Nov. 21, 2014 Obama Remarks, supra note 24.
See, e.g., Lauren-Brooke Eisen, ‘Felons, Not Families’ Oversimplifies a Complex Reality, HUFF. POST:
THE BLOG (Nov. 24, 2014, 12:44 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/laurenbrooke-eisen/
felons-not-families-overs_b_6212550.html [http://perma.cc/44QH-F4D2].
See Nov. 21, 2014 Obama Remarks, supra note 24; see also Priorities Memo, supra note 6.
Priorities Memo, supra note 6, at 3–4.
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“criminal aliens,” include those convicted of the reified significant misdemeanor,
as well as those convicted of three or more misdemeanors.62
4.

Cumulative Harms: Layering Immigration Enforcement on Criminal
Justice Dysfunction

The Priorities Memo’s refocusing of immigration enforcement toward individuals with an increasingly broad array of misdemeanor convictions demands
an analysis of the mechanisms by which immigrants become misdemeanants. By
explicitly naming misdemeanants as priorities for detention and removal, DHS
piles the shortcomings of the misdemeanor adjudication system on top of the
harms of the immigration system, creating cumulative harms.
A broad and growing literature describes the effects stemming from criminal convictions as collateral consequences.63 While much of this literature has
touched on the consequences of felony convictions, the consequences extend to
all convictions, including misdemeanor ones.64 The collateral consequences of
misdemeanors, even for individuals who do not spend a day in jail, include fines
and supervisions that derail economic and personal well-being, inhibiting an individual’s access to public benefits and higher education (including educational
loans), and preventing him or her from getting a job, loan, or lease.65 Immigration consequences are chief among the frequently listed collateral consequences
of criminal convictions. Indeed, an entire “crimmigration” literature and legal
practice have grown around this topic, encouraged by the Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, which recognizes that competent criminal defense
must include consideration of the immigration consequences of criminal pleas.66

62.
63.

64.
65.
66.

Id.
See, e.g., Michael Pinard, Collateral Consequence of Criminal Convictions: Confronting Issues of Race and
Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 457 (2010) (comparing collateral consequences of criminal convictions
in the United States with other countries); see also DEVAH PAGER, MARKED: RACE, CRIME, AND
FINDING WORK IN AN ERA OF MASS INCARCERATION (Univ. of Chicago Press, 2007)
(examining the effect of easily accessible arrest records on employment opportunities for convicted
individuals); Anthony C. Thompson, Navigating the Hidden Obstacles to Ex-Offender Reentry, 45
B.C.L. REV. 255, 282–83 (2004) (discussing felon disenfranchisement).
See Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1089–94 (2015)
(arguing for decriminalization of minor offenses to reduce the collateral consequence of nonfelony
convictions).
Id. at 1103.
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374–75 (2010); see also César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández,
Strickland-Lite: Padilla’s Two-Tiered Duty for Noncitizens, 72 MD. L. REV. 844 (2013) (analyzing a
trend toward extension of the right to counsel in immigration proceeding and concluding that
Padilla adopts a “Strickland-lite” approach that weakens the standard for effective assistance of
counsel as compared to criminal proceedings).
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Given the full integration of the criminal and immigration systems—an
integration that flows in both directions—the term collateral consequences may
no longer serve to describe the relationship between the two systems. The immigration system has now been injected into the criminal system in the form of requests by ICE to the criminal system to notify ICE officers of the arrests of
noncitizens (known as ICE detainers or ICE holds); the full integration of immigration databases into the fingerprinting procedures of the criminal system;
and the deputizing (both formal and informal) of local law enforcement to carry
out immigration functions.67 Likewise, the criminal system has been injected
into the immigration system, with the traditionally civil immigration system
taking on the punitive aspects of criminal law,68 and with the vast expansion of
the categories of crimes that can result in expulsion or exclusion.69 With this
backdrop, the term collateral consequences centers only the criminal experience
and sees all consequences of the criminal contact as secondary. Particularly in
the misdemeanor realm, however, the criminal consequences may pale compared
to the almost guaranteed months (and possibly years) of immigration detention
and the almost certain exile that many misdemeanor convictions now engender.
For these reasons, cumulative consequences may be a more apt descriptor than
collateral consequences.
In the context of the creation of the significant misdemeanor, peeling apart
these layers of cumulative harms requires an examination of the dysfunctions of
the misdemeanor adjudication system. In a series of articles, criminal scholar
Alexandra Natapoff presents a devastating critique of the use of the misdemeanor
as a tool of criminal punishment.70 Contending that the “U.S. criminal process

67.
68.

69.
70.

See Chacón, supra note 13, at 643–46.
See Robert Pauw, A New Look at Deportation as Punishment: Why at Least Some of the Constitution’s
Criminal Procedure Protections Must Apply, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 305 (2000) (comparing distinctions
between punitive civil remedies and deportation proceedings to argue that the procedural safeguards
present in criminal proceedings should extend to deportation proceedings); see also Legomsky, supra
note 12 (arguing that “immigration law has been absorbing the theories, methods, perceptions, and
priorities of the criminal enforcement model” while explicitly rejecting the procedural ingredients of
criminal adjudication).
The drastic rise in the percentage of federal criminal cases related to the immigration crimes of illegal
entry and illegal reentry, alongside the proliferation of state and local ordinances criminalizing
migration-related offenses, also forms part of this picture. See Chacón, supra note 13, at 614–16.
See Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1313–14 (2012) [hereinafter
Natapoff, Misdemeanors] (arguing that informal, deregulated processing, weak prosecutorial
screening, poor defense bar, and high plea rates contribute to mass conviction of petty misdemeanor
offenses, which carry harsh consequences and implicate due process concerns); see also Alexandra
Natapoff, Aggregation and Urban Misdemeanors, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1043 (2013) (critiquing
the practice of aggregate treatment of misdemeanor offenses, which are increasingly addressed by
category instead of individual treatment according to standard local practices and pricing); Natapoff,
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cannot be fully understood or evaluated without acknowledging the centrality of
petty offenses[,]”71 she finds that the lack of procedural integrity and the racialization of crime constitute core attributes of misdemeanor convictions.72 Natapoff presents convincing evidence that the lack of procedural integrity in
misdemeanor processing frequently leads to wrongful convictions rooted in the
absence of evidence of individual fault.73 On the racialization of crime, she
demonstrates that the lack of procedure during the plea or trial phase of the misdemeanor process transfers the legal authority, as to who will be convicted, to
police officers at the moment of arrest. This transfer means that a misdemeanor
arrest is overwhelmingly likely to result in a misdemeanor conviction. Because
racial profiling is a reality in urban policing, the increased legal authority given to
police officers translates into the mass criminalization of people of color, particularly those most likely to draw police attention, including young men, and
queer and gender-nonconforming people.74 Drawing in part on Natapoff's
work, immigration scholar Jason Cade has also tackled what he calls the “plea
bargain crisis” for noncitizens in misdemeanor courts, arguing that for reasons
having to do with dysfunction in both the criminal and immigration systems, a
noncitizen’s low-level conviction does not reliably indicate guilt and is likely to
be the product of unchecked constitutional rights violations.75
Young Latino men, the group that disproportionately bears the brunt of
the immigration detention and removal apparatus,76 are among the young men
of color most likely to be subject to misdemeanor arrests without probable cause,
particularly when they reside in poor communities where high-volume policing
is the norm.77 Natapoff lays out the many reasons police may arrest for reasons
other than probable cause, including control of the streets and assertion of police
authority.78 These arrests are rarely scrutinized, and lack of prosecutorial screening,
lack of counsel, and the pressure to plead result in a misdemeanor arrest translating
almost automatically into a conviction. With ten million misdemeanor cases filed

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

supra note 64 (analyzing the recent trend toward decriminalizing misdemeanor offenses to meet the
current mass incarceration policy developments).
Natapoff, Misdemeanors, supra note 70, at 1317.
Id. at 1317.
Id.
Id. at 1319.
See Jason A. Cade, The Plea-Bargain Crisis for Noncitizens in Misdemeanor Court, 34 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1751 (2013).
See ICE Deportations: Gender, Age, and Country of Citizenship, TRAC IMMIGR. (Apr. 9, 2014),
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/350 [http://perma.cc/X5QV-V7H3] (noting that between
2012 and 2013, more than 90 percent of ICE deportees were male).
Natapoff, Misdemeanors, supra note 70, at 1330–31.
Id. at 1331–32.
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annually in the United States (as compared to the one million felony convictions
entered),79 the misdemeanor process represents “the concrete mechanism by
which the system is able to generate ‘criminals’ based on race, class, and social vulnerability, unconstrained by evidentiary requirements.”80
The problems with which Natapoff and others have diagnosed the criminal
justice system, particularly with regard to misdemeanor offenses, become layered
on top of the harms of the immigration system. This cumulative effect can be
witnessed most clearly when considering the role that race plays in immigration
enforcement, at both the local criminal enforcement and federal immigration enforcement levels. Jennifer Chacón, Yolanda Velasquez, and others have tracked
the way local law enforcement officers may “more vigorously police populations
that they identify as potentially ‘illegal,’” leading to the racial profiling of poor
Latinos and others who live in immigrant communities.81 These individuals may
be more likely “to be stopped, arrested, and detained for low-level state and local
criminal offenses as they are caught up in an informal dragnet aimed at immigration violators.”82 The racially disparate effects of this informal dragnet have been
verified by researchers at the Warren Institute, who found that when local police
in Irving, Texas, were given 24-hour access to ICE officers, Latinos were arrested
for the lowest-level misdemeanor offenses at rates significantly higher than whites
and African Americans.83 The brushes with law enforcement for low-level misdemeanors led to many of those arrested being transferred to ICE custody, presumably for detention and deportation.84 The study’s authors concluded that the
ICE-police partnership “tacitly encourages local police to arrest Hispanics for
petty offenses.”85
The racialization of crime endemic to the misdemeanor process is layered
on top of the informal dragnet deployed against those who are perceived to be not
only people of color but also potentially noncitizens. These dual phenomena present arguably the worst manifestation of the cumulative harms of the criminal and
migratory control systems. The Executive Branch’s buttressing of the significant
misdemeanor priority (and the three or more misdemeanor priority category)

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

84.
85.

Id. at 1314–15.
Id. at 1368.
Chacón, supra note 13, at 646.
Id.
Trevor Gardner II & Aarti Kohli, The C.A.P. Effect: Racial Profiling in the ICE Criminal Alien
Program, CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN INST. ON RACE, ETHNICITY & DIVERSITY 1, 2 (Sept.
2009), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/policybrief_irving_0909_v9.pdf [https://perma.cc/J4JBJPEY].
See id. at 3.
Id.
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should be considered in light of these cumulative harms. By explicitly naming
misdemeanants as priorities for detention and removal, DHS layers the
shortcomings of the misdemeanor adjudication system on top of the harms of
the immigration system. DHS generates “criminal aliens” along lines of race,
class, and social vulnerability in conjunction with the criminal justice system.86
The inclusion of the significant misdemeanor and the three or more misdemeanors categories in the Priorities Memo—categories that focus on a broad
range of minor criminal conduct for which the most disadvantaged populations
are targeted—reaffirms the validity of using crime as a tool of immigration enforcement, even as it ignores the dysfunctions in the criminal system.87
5.

Immigration Enforcement Has Become Self-Generating

The inclusion of misdemeanors in the Priorities Memo also contributes to
the self-generating nature of the immigration enforcement system, a process parallel to what is occurring in the criminal system. In her article, “Incarceration
American-Style,” criminal scholar Sharon Dolovich explores the claim that the
U.S. carceral system, while falling far short of serving society’s interests, has
become immune from challenges and has become self-perpetuating.88 She argues
that there is nothing inevitable about incarceration, but that the inability to imagine a response other than incarceration stems not from “the offenders’ choice to
offend, but society’s choice to respond to those offenses with time in prison.”89
Incarceration, according to Dolovich, “has become the first-line policy response
to a range of social problems, the instinctive American response to perceived
threats to the social order.”90 She further proposes that the criminal system
“makes its own inmates.”91 She gives examples of the harms and humiliations
that accompany prison life and life after prison for those marked as ex-cons; these
harms are a force in generating behavior that leads to further imprisonment.92
The immigration enforcement apparatus appears to have also reached the
point of self-generation, albeit through different mechanisms. This is due, in no
small part, to the ever-increasing ties between criminal punishment and immigra86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

See Natapoff, Misdemeanors, supra note 70, at 1368 (discussing the effect of misdemeanors on the
generation of criminals along lines of race, class, and social vulnerability).
See Natapoff, supra note 64, at 1066 (arguing that decriminalization of minor offenses, while
addressing procedural questions regarding punishment, fails to address more global criticisms of the
criminal justice system).
See Sharon Dolovich, Foreword: Incarceration American-Style, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 237 (2009).
Id. at 241.
Id. at 239.
Id. at 243.
Id.
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tion enforcement.93 The self-generation of immigration enforcement can be seen
in the way that the President’s Executive Actions marked a new category of people—those who have been convicted of significant misdemeanors or three or more
misdemeanors—as criminal aliens.94 Even as the Executive Branch potentially
removed some individuals from ICE’s crosshairs by expanding deferred action
through DAPA and expanded DACA, it redirected enforcement by expanding
the category of those who were proper subjects of ICE’s attentions. The “felons,
not families” catchphrase in the President’s speech announcing the Executive Actions, combined with the expansion of the categories of those considered criminal
aliens to include more petty offenders, displays this self-generating logic; the federal immigration enforcement apparatus can no longer seem to imagine a response
to unlawful migration that does not further the criminalization of immigrants.
As in the criminal context, then, the federal immigration system “makes its own
inmates”95 by constantly expanding the categories of immigrants who can be subject to its detention and deportation powers.
Ironically, it is exactly this expansion of immigration enforcement, hand in
hand with the consolidation of the immigration and criminal systems, that also
leads the immigration system to “make its own inmates” in the more literal sense
Dolovich describes.96 The noncitizens, identified as “criminal aliens” through the
criminal system and are subsequently deported, include many who leave behind
deep community ties and who seek to reenter the United States following their
removal.97 The Executive Actions memoranda included this category of deportees as Priority 1 (the highest priority level), in the same document that establishes
those convicted of significant misdemeanors or three or more misdemeanors as
the second-highest priority.98 Under this guidance, a noncitizen who is convicted
of a DUI would be prioritized for transfer to immigration detention and likely
deported, because a DUI conviction is considered a significant misdemeanor.99
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See García Hernández, supra note 107, at 1457–58.
See Priorities Memo, supra note 6, at 3–4; see also Deferred Action Memo, supra note 30, at 4.
See Dolovich, supra note 88, at 243.
See id.
See Erin R. Hamilton, Deportees Will Risk Harsh Penalties to Return to Families in the U.S., 3 CTR.
FOR POVERTY RES. 1, 1 (2013), http://poverty.ucdavis.edu/sites/main/files/file-attachments/cpr
_hamilton_immigration_brief.pdf [http://perma.cc/E3EA-P4RQ] (“In 2013, the U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement [ICE] agency deported 72,000 parents of children who are U.S. citizens.
These parents make up one-fourth of all deportees.”).
See Priorities Memo, supra note 6, at 3–4.
See id. at 4. There is not strict uniformity or court interpretation of the term “significant misdemeanor”
and not every driving under the influence (DUI) conviction will necessarily be considered to be one.
Whether a DUI is considered a significant misdemeanor will vary by jurisdiction and by the applicable
state statute. As of September 2015, ICE had released guidance stating,
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If they sought to rejoin their families and communities by reentering the United
States, they would become “Priority 1 threats to national security, border security,
and public safety” because “aliens apprehended at the border or ports of entry
while attempting to unlawfully enter the United States” are included in this category.100 Thus, a misdemeanant seeking to enter the United States subsequent to
his removal is second only to “aliens engaged in or suspected of terrorism or espionage”101 in the list of priorities for the immigration enforcement system. In this
way, the Priorities Memo serves to “make inmates” by creating self-perpetuating
targets for immigration detention and removal.102
As Priority 1 threats, these noncitizens deported following DUI convictions
will face further hurdles if they attempt to return following their deportations.
In years past, noncitizens arrested at the border attempting to enter the country
unlawfully might spend a few nights in immigration detention before being
removed, or might be deported the same day.103 In recent years, however, a
new tactic has been used: Those caught trying to unlawfully enter the United
States now face criminal prosecution—and subsequent incarceration in federal
prisons—for the federal crimes of illegal entry (the crime of crossing the border
unlawfully) and illegal reentry (the crime of crossing the border unlawfully after
a previous removal (deportation)).104 Only after completing criminal sentences
are these noncitizens then subject to immigration enforcement in the form of
deportation. With more than two million individuals deported during the first

100.
101.
102.
103.

104.

When determining whether a conviction for DUI is a significant misdemeanor, the elements of the applicable state law must be considered. A conviction (requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt) for DUI is a significant misdemeanor if
the state statute of conviction: (1) constitutes a misdemeanor as defined by federal
law (the minimum penalty includes imprisonment for more than 5 days but not
more than 1 year); (2) requires the operation of a motor vehicle; and (3) requires, as
an element of the offense, either a finding of impairment or a blood alcohol content of .08 or higher.
See Frequently Asked Questions Relating to Executive Action on Immigration, U.S. IMMIGR. &
CUSTOMS ENF’T, https://www.ice.gov/ImmigrationAction/faqs [https://perma.cc/DEY6-JRJ9]
(last visited Jan. 5, 2016).
See Priorities Memo, supra note 6, at 3.
See id.
See Dolovich, supra note 88, at 243.
See Lara Jakes Jordan, U.S. Ends ‘Catch-and-Release’ at Border, WASH. POST (Aug. 23, 2006),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/08/23/AR2006082301082.html
[http://perma.cc/XT9N-UPTZ] (“Nearly all non-Mexican illegal immigrants caught sneaking
into the United States are being held until they can be returned to their home countries . . . [t]he
new policy generally does not apply to Mexicans, who are almost immediately returned to Mexico
after being stopped by Border Patrol agents.”).
See Michael T. Light, Mark Hugo Lopez & Ana Gonzalez-Barrera, The Rise of Federal Immigration
Crimes: Unlawful Reentry Drives Growth, PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.pewhispa
nic.org/2014/03/18/the-rise-of-federal-immigration-crimes [http://perma.cc/F3H C-HMJP].
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six years of the Obama Administration, hundreds of thousands may attempt to
return to the United States to rejoin their communities.105 If the prosecution of
the immigration crimes of illegal entry and illegal reentry continues at its current
rate, many of those attempting to return will find themselves in federal prison if
they are caught at the border. Again, in this situation, the Executive Branch can
be said to be “making its own inmates” by deporting millions, then criminally
prosecuting those who inevitably return. This process bleeds across the line to
the carceral system Dolovich critiques, as immigration-related crimes overtake
drug offenses as the largest chunk of the federal criminal enforcement pie.106
Even as the federal government cements the strategy of making it acceptable to both punish immigrants who have committed crimes with detention and
removal and punish those who attempt to reenter after removal,107 it expands the
categories of people who can be considered punishable. A strategy of targeting
“felons, not families”108 only makes sense if there is an ever-widening group of
“criminal aliens” to target. In 2007, the ACLU of Massachusetts exposed Operation Endgame—an ICE operation that endeavored to remove all unauthorized migrants by 2012.109 ICE authorities quickly responded to the revelation by
removing any mention of Operation Endgame from their publicly available documents.110 Despite ICE’s attempts to hide explicit mention of its mission, the
underlying logic of Operation Endgame is alive and well in the Executive Actions’ treatment of individuals with misdemeanor convictions.

105. Hamilton, supra note 97, at 2.
106. See id.; see also Turning Migrants into Criminals: The Harmful Impact of US Border Prosecutions,

107.

108.
109.
110.

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 2 (May 2013), http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0513
_ForUpload_2.pdf [http://perma.cc/N8M2-HLZZ] (“In 2002, there were 3,000 prosecutions for
illegal entry and 8,000 for illegal reentry; a decade later, in 2012, these prosecutions had increased to
48,000 and 37,000, respectively. These cases now outnumber other frequently prosecuted federal
offenses such as drug, firearm, and white collar crimes.”).
See César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Immigration Detention as Punishment, 61 UCLA L. REV.
1346, 1349–50 (2014) (arguing that, under the Supreme Court admonition to consider the
legislative intent of a statutory provision authorizing detention in order to distinguish regulatory
from punitive detention, immigration legislation and the legacy Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) detention authority have clearly moved immigration remedies from civil to punitive
measures).
See Nov. 21, 2014 Obama Remarks, supra note 24.
Carol Rose & Christopher Ott, Inhumane Raid Was Just one of Many, BOS. GLOBE (Mar. 26, 2007),
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2007/03/26/inhumane_raid_
was_just_one_of_many [http://perma.cc/6UJ4-EC7B].
See “Endgame” Documents: Before and After, ACLU OF MASS. (Apr. 4, 2007, 11:00 PM), http://209.
68.62.227/endgame [https://perma.cc/C3XS-4HRX].
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The Secure Communities Memo

This Part analyzes the strategy through which the criminal alien category
comes to have meaning as a vector for detention and deportation of unauthorized
migrants by examining a second Executive Actions memorandum, the Secure
Communities Memo.111 With this memorandum, DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson
announced the termination of the Secure Communities (S-Comm) program,
one of the Obama Administration’s chief initiatives to track and deport immigrants who have come into contact with the criminal system. In its place, Secretary Johnson declared the creation of the Priority Enforcement Program (PEP).112
This Part tracks the initial development of S-Comm and provides a preliminary
evaluation of the newly announced PEP. It also analyzes advocacy and organizing against S-Comm, contending that this advocacy created a crisis of legitimacy
for S-Comm that the President resolved through the Executive Actions’ creation
of PEP. This Part argues that PEP, however, ultimately redirects and refines the
underlying technologies and policies of S-Comm, rather than ending them.
1.

Background on S-Comm

The Bush Administration originally unveiled the S-Comm program in
March 2008.113 The centerpiece of S-Comm was the full integration of immigration and criminal databases, with the goal of comprehensive information sharing
between local criminal law enforcement and federal immigration enforcement.114
Before S-Comm, immigration officers had no automated way to run the names
and fingerprints of noncitizens held by the criminal system against immigration
databases. S-Comm provided this mechanism; with S-Comm, every time local
law enforcement ran a person’s name through the national Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) database (a practice in which every law enforcement office

111. See Secure Communities Memo, supra note 29.
112. Id. at 3.
113. See ICE Unveils Sweeping New Plan to Target Criminal Aliens in Jails Nationwide, U.S. IMMIGR. &

CUSTOMS ENF’T (Apr. 14, 2008), https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/ice-unveils-sweeping-newplan-target-criminal-aliens-jails-nationwide-0 [https://perma.cc/NB2R-Y93B].
114. Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Policing Immigration, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 87, 95 (2013)
(describing the integration of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) biometric database, the
Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT), and ICE’s Law Enforcement Support
Center, which reviews and assesses arrestee status using all available information, including
fingerprints).
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engages to look for past warrants and past criminal history of arrestees), that
information would be transferred by the FBI to ICE.115
S-Comm brought local involvement in immigration enforcement to unprecedented levels, with immigration legal scholars citing the program as “the largest
expansion of local involvement in immigration enforcement in the nation’s history.”116 S-Comm reached past simply targeting noncitizens who came into contact with the criminal system, as the low-tech version of S-Comm, the Criminal
Alien Program, had done for nearly two decades before S-Comm’s inception.117 Under the Criminal Alien Program, individuals who interfaced with local
law enforcement already had to be identified as foreign born for ICE to be able to
interview them. This labor-intensive process was circumvented by S-Comm,
which extended the screening by the federal government for immigration violations to every person—citizen and noncitizen alike—arrested by a local law enforcement officer anywhere in the country.118 Even if local law enforcement did
not want to submit their arrestees’ fingerprints to ICE for checks against their
databases, they had no choice, as there was no mechanism for them to request
that the FBI not pass on the fingerprints to ICE.119
The stated goals of S-Comm were to “identify and remove criminal aliens
and others who pose a potential threat to public safety” in the name of “smart,
effective immigration enforcement.”120 The program epitomized the Obama
Administration’s adoption of the “smart enforcement” ideal.121 The seemingly

115. See Michele Waslin, The Secure Communities Program: Unanswered Questions and Continuing
116.
117.
118.
119.

120.
121.

Concerns, IMMIGR. POL’Y CTR. 11 (Nov. 2011), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/
files/docs/Secure_Communities_112911_updated.pdf [http://perma.cc/CSG5-NGM9].
Cox & Miles, supra note 114, at 93.
For a portrait of the Criminal Alien Program, see Anil Kalhan, Immigration Policing and Federalism
Through the Lens of Technology, Surveillance, and Privacy, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 1105, 1118 (2013).
See Cox & Miles, supra note 114, at 93.
As S-Comm spread nationwide, Obama announced the rollback of 287(g) agreements, or federallocal agreements that deputized local law enforcement officers as immigration authorities. Because
of the broad and mandatory reach of S-Comm, the administration may have had less of a need for
287(g), which required trainings and memoranda of understanding to be signed and implemented
with local law enforcement agencies. S-Comm thus became the primary vector for identifying
noncitizens who experienced arrests by local law enforcement officials. See Ted Hesson, As One
Immigration Enforcement Program Fades Away, Another Rises, ABC NEWS (Dec. 27, 2012), http://
abcnews.go.com/ABC_Univision/News/immigration-enforcement-program-287g-scaledback/story?id=18077757 [http://perma.cc/N5CF-LHYF].
Secure Communities: Get the Facts, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, http://www.ice.gov/secure-co
mmunities/get-the-facts [https://web.archive.org/web/20150409114817/http://www.ice.gov/secure
-communities/get-the-facts] (last visited Apr. 9, 2015).
See Fact Sheet: Smart, Effective Border Security and Immigration Enforcement, U.S. DEP’T. OF
HOMELAND SEC. (Oct. 4, 2011), http://www.dhs.gov/news/2011/10/04/fact-sheet-smart-effec
tive-border-security-and-immigration-enforcement [http://perma.cc/Y887-DXBF] (“DHS is
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indiscriminate removals under the Obama Administration, which had surpassed
the two million mark at the time of this writing, were a direct result of this strategy. “Smart enforcement,” characterized by the supposed sorting of migrants by
risk level that S-Comm facilitated (and which PEP solidifies), in reality resulted
in the possible removal of any noncitizen who came into contact with law enforcement; regardless of where they fell in the risk-level categorization provided
by S-Comm, they were counted as “criminal aliens.”122
From S-Comm’s inception, the government appeared to pursue a different
agenda than “smart, effective immigration enforcement.”123 DHS activated the
program county by county over the course of several years, based on what they
referred to as a “risk-based rollout strategy” meant to target those counties with the
highest possible percentage of noncitizens.124 Adam Cox and Thomas Miles carried out an empirical study tracking the activation, finding that “Hispanics constituted 37.9 percent of the population in early-activating counties and only 6.8
percent in counties activating later.”125 They also found that that while early activation targeted counties “with large Hispanic populations,” it “did not target
counties with large noncitizen populations.”126 They concluded, “the correlation
between activation and Hispanic population is extremely persistent: it remains
large and statistically significant even when we control for border proximity and
myriad other factors on which the government might have relied in deciding
where to target its limited enforcement resources.”127 In analyzing their data,
Cox and Miles cite to Bernard Harcourt’s critique of the rise in the role of prediction and systematization, acknowledging that the seemingly neutral mode of
policing that S-Comm represents “can in practice concentrate the burdens of
law enforcement on minority communities.”128 Cox and Miles’ study demonstrates that the “smart enforcement” strategy was an explicitly racialized one,

122.

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

focused on smart and effective enforcement of U.S. immigration laws in a manner that best
promotes public safety, border security, and the integrity of the immigration system.”).
See Secure Communities and ICE Deportation: A Failed Program?, TRAC IMMIGR. (Apr. 8, 2014),
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/349 [http://perma.cc/UVP2-BW4T] (“Analysis of ICE
data covering these 2.3 million deportations obtained by [Transactional Records Access
Clearinghouse (TRAC)] show that while the agency was able to increase the number of noncitizens
it deported who had been convicted of a crime, this was largely a result of an increase in the
deportations of individuals whose most serious conviction was an immigration or traffic violation.”).
Secure Communities: Get the Facts, supra note 120.
Cox & Miles, supra note 114, at 105.
Id. at 114.
Id. at 121.
Id. at 134.
Id. at 133.

Challenging the “Criminal Alien” Paradigm

619

disproportionately distributing the burden of detention and deportation of immigrants on Latino communities.
By the beginning of 2013, S-Comm was activated in all counties.129
Despite the pushback from local jurisdictions that resisted activation, S-Comm
achieved its greatest success by bringing information sharing between local
criminal and federal immigration officials to new heights. Data sharing was
only part of the work of S-Comm, however. The integration of the databases allowed ICE officials to be notified when the immigration databases registered a
match—that is, when the person arrested had a record of being fingerprinted by
a federal immigration official. At this point, ICE officials had the option to issue a detainer on the person, or a request that the state or local jail facility hold
the person for an extra 48 hours, ostensibly to allow ICE to interview her.130 In
practice, the ICE detainers meant the nearly automatic transfer of individuals
from police custody to ICE custody, with detention and removal proceedings
ensuing.
While ICE initially claimed to be most interested in pursuing immigrants
who had already been convicted of crimes, the agency abandoned this in practice, issuing detainer requests indiscriminately for anyone who had been arrested, fingerprinted, and was identified as being a match with the databases.131
The program statistics showed that in 2011, over half of those removed due to
S-Comm either had no criminal conviction at all, or a conviction for a minor
crime resulting in a sentence less than a year.132 This belied the agency’s own
S-Comm propaganda, which claimed that “ICE prioritizes the removal of criminal aliens by focusing efforts on the most dangerous and violent offenders.”133

129. See Activated Jurisdictions, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T 1 (2013), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/

130.
131.
132.

133.

secure-communities/pdf/sc-activated.pdf [https://perma.cc/KYA9-4DSQ] (“As of January 22,
2013, the biometric information sharing capability is activated in 3,181 jurisdictions in 50 states, U.S.
Territories and Washington D.C.”).
See Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Secure Communities (SC) Standard Operating
Procedures (SOP), U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. 8 (2009), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/sec
ure_communities/securecommunitiesops93009.pdf [https://perma.cc/8MNU-7LGT].
See Secure Communities and ICE Deportation: A Failed Program?, supra note 122.
Secure Communities: IDENT/IAFIS Interoperability: Monthly Statistics Through September 30, 2011,
U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T (Oct. 14, 2011), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/sc-stats/
nationwide_interoperability_stats-fy2011-to-date.pdf [https://perma.cc/2VTP-B5BB] (Eightytwo percent of undocumented IDENT matches resulted in identification of an individual charged
with a Level 2 or Level 3 offense, which constitute minor crimes resulting in a sentence less than a
year. Four percent of undocumented IDENT matches resulted in identification of individuals with
no charges).
Secure Communities: A Modernized Approach to Identifying and Removing Criminal Aliens, U.S.
IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T (Jan. 2010), http://www.cityofws.org/portals/0/pdf/police/sc_bro
chure_508.pdf [http://perma.cc/PMU6-2XNC].
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An analysis of removal data spanning from 2008 to 2013 came to the same conclusion: the number of individuals considered Level 1 offenders, S-Comm’s designated target, actually declined during the time period studied.134 Among those
who were deported with a criminal offense on their record, the top four categories were illegal entry (with 46,759 removals in fiscal year 2013), DUI (with
29,852 removals in the same time period), a traffic offense (15,548 removals),
and marijuana possession (6770 removals).135 Given that illegal entry and DUI
hold the top two places in this list, it is unsurprising that with the November
2014 Executive Actions, DHS announced that those who enter the country
unlawfully and those with a DUI (a significant misdemeanor) will now be considered Priority 1 and Priority 2 for removal, respectively.136
By elevating reentry and traffic offenses to high-priority reasons for removal,
ICE has successfully matched its rhetoric to the reality of removals of individuals
with low-level misdemeanors or simple violations. ICE appears to be using this
rebranding mechanism to immunize itself from the critiques that plagued the
S-Comm program and led to its announced termination.
2.

Critiques of S-Comm and Its Refinement Into the PEP Program

Drawing anything but a conjectural link between activism and advocacy on
one hand, and changes in government policy on the other, can often prove difficult. In the Secure Communities Memo, however, DHS Secretary Johnson explicitly acknowledges the role that community opposition played in the decision
to discontinue S-Comm:
[T]he reality is the program has attracted a great deal of criticism, is
widely misunderstood, and is embroiled in litigation; its very name
has become a symbol for general hostility toward the enforcement of
our immigration laws. Governors, mayors, and state and local law
enforcement officials around the country have increasingly refused to
cooperate with the program, and many have issued executive orders
or signed laws prohibiting such cooperation.137

134. See Secure Communities and ICE Deportation: A Failed Program?, supra note 122 (“More striking is

that there has been an absolute decline in the number of noncitizens removed who have been
convicted of any crime apart from traffic and immigration.”).
135. Id. at Table 5.
136. As discussed supra note 96, whether a particular DUI conviction is ultimately considered a significant
misdemeanor will vary by jurisdiction and by the applicable state statute.
137. Secure Communities Memo, supra note 29, at 1.
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The Secretary’s acknowledgement of the pushback against S-Comm was a departure, as a rigorous defense of S-Comm had until that point characterized
ICE’s responses to the program's critics.138
The resistance to S-Comm was broad ranging; everyone from law enforcement officials to immigration attorneys to undocumented activists participated in resisting the program, with demands ranging from requests for reform
and transparency to demands that the program be ended, not mended.139 Despite
the range of actors and tactics, those pushing against S-Comm were united in
some common critiques. Ultimately, these critiques attacked the way the program was being carried out in seeming opposition to its stated goal of arresting
and deporting “criminal aliens.” Meanwhile, attacks to the underlying logic of
the removal of so-called criminal aliens were virtually nonexistent. The absence of
critiques of the underlying goals of S-Comm is reflected in the limited changes
announced by the Obama Administration in November 2014. While the Secure
Communities Memo announced that S-Comm “as we know it, will be discontinued,” the announced changes constitute a mere rebranding of S-Comm. The new
version of S-Comm, which the Memo announces “should be referred to as the
‘Priority Enforcement Program’ or ‘PEP,’”140 amounts to a refinement rather than
a dismantling of S-Comm.
Critique 1: S-Comm Cast Too Wide a Net
The resistance against S-Comm fell under two primary categories: (a) critiques of whom the program was sweeping up, and (b) critiques of the manner in
which the program’s dragnet was being deployed. The first critique was premised
on the claim that S-Comm was not doing what ICE claimed it would do. Advo138. See, e.g., ICE Response to the Task Force on Secure Communities Findings and Recommendations, U.S.

IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T (Apr. 27, 2012), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hsac/iceresponse-to-task-force-on-secure-communities.pdf [http://perma.cc/L7S2-9B7D] (presenting a
staunch, defensive position in response to critiques by the Task Force on Secure Communities,
created in June 2011 at the request of Jeh Johnson, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS)).
139. See, e.g., Pablo Alvarado, Secure Communities: “End It, Don’t Mend It,” HUFF. POST BLOG (May
24, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/pablo-alvarado/secure-communities-end-it_b_1375
81 4.html [http://perma.cc/C4R2-2JYY] (arguing that reforms to S-Comm do not go far
enough and advocating for a complete end to the program); Elise Foley, Congressional Hispanic
Caucus Demands Deportation Changes, HUFF. POST (Apr. 4, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2014/04/04/congressional-hispanic-caucus-deportation_n_5092192.html [http://perma.cc/
UMA5-K79A] (explaining a 2014 letter from the Hispanic Caucus to Secretary Johnson calling
for reform to deportation priorities and policies, as well as “ending programs that lead to many
deportations such as [S-Comm] and the 287(g) policy”).
140. Secure Communities Memo, supra note 29, at 3.
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cates challenged S-Comm’s overly broad net, presenting evidence that S-Comm
was leading to the deportation of immigrants who were labeled as relatively innocent, not the hardened “criminal aliens” the program was purportedly designed
to target.141 University-based think tanks and nonprofit immigrant advocacy
organizations released multiple reports on the program.142 These reports refuted
the government’s claim that S-Comm was truly targeting “criminal aliens.”
They exposed that many of those swept up by S-Comm came into police custody for traffic offenses (including DUIs) and other low-level criminal conduct.
Moreover, the reports showed that many were never convicted of the crime for
which they were arrested, but were nonetheless routed to immigration detention
and into removal (deportation) proceedings.143 The bottom line to these critiques was that the government’s own data about the removals that resulted from
S-Comm did not match its rhetoric about focusing on individuals with serious
criminal convictions.144
The Secure Communities Memo appears to respond to this critique by directing ICE, in this new era, to facilitate only the removal of those who are convicted of certain offenses. Citing to the Priorities Memo (discussed in Part I.A,
supra), the Secure Communities Memo, through PEP, directs ICE to seek the
“transfer of an alien” if she falls under Priority 1 (except for those who are apprehended at the border or ports of entry) or subsections (a) and (b) of Priority 2.145

141. See, e.g., Shelve Secure Communities, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/

142.

143.
144.
145.

aug/12/opinion/la-ed-secure-20110812 [http://perma.cc/SGM5-JYSC] (“States signed up for [SComm] because they thought it would make their neighborhoods safer by getting serious criminals
off the streets. But the government’s own data indicate that more than half of those deported under
the program were undocumented immigrants with no criminal record or only minor ones—not
violent felons.”); see also Let Police Pursue Criminals, Not Immigrants, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2011),
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/mar/11/opinion/la-ed-secure-20110311 [http://perma.cc/B2QWUYQU] (“[S-Comm] isn’t succeeding at targeting violent criminals. Instead, it is increasingly
diverting police from public safety for other purposes.”).
See, e.g., Waslin, supra note 115, at 9–10 (describing the failure of S-Comm to make good on the
goal to deport “dangerous criminals,” instead deporting first-time minor offenders or those who were
not charged with any crime); see also Andrea Guttin, The Criminal Alien Program: Immigration
Enforcement in Travis County, Texas, IMMIGR. POL’Y CTR. 8–9 (Feb. 2010), http://www.immi
grationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/Criminal_Alien_Program_021710.pdf [https://web.archiv
e.org/web/20150906114645/http://immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/Criminal_Alien_
Program_021710.pdf] (examining the use of jail status check programs under the S-Comm
program in Travis County, Texas, which prompted deportation of immigrants apprehended for
minor offenses, and in many cases without any criminal charges or history); see also Secure
Communities and ICE Deportation: A Failed Program?, supra note 122 (In 2013, ICE deported
151,833 undocumented immigrants without any criminal convictions).
See sources cited supra note 142.
See id.
Secure Communities Memo, supra note 29, at 2.
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These categories are composed of those convicted of three or more misdemeanors and those convicted of significant misdemeanors.146
The Secure Community Memo’s adoption of the Priorities Memo’s new
categories reflects the deportations that had already been taking place under
S-Comm since 2008. An April 2014 report relying on ICE’s own data found
that in 2013, 216,810 people with criminal convictions were deported (out of a
total of 368,644 deportations).147 The top two offenses for those deported with
convictions were the federal misdemeanor of illegal entry (46,759 deportations),
followed by the traffic offense of DUI (29,852 deportations).148 Those arrested
for illegal entry face nearly automatic deportation at the end of their federal
criminal sentences.149 Their original arrests are often carried out by immigration
authorities themselves, so S-Comm is not necessary to apprehend this population. For the second largest category, however, the existence of local and federal
law enforcement partnerships is necessary in order to turn a DUI into a deportation order.
By transforming the DUI into a significant misdemeanor through the Priorities Memo, and then naming those with significant misdemeanors as appropriate “criminal alien” targets for the revamped S-Comm in the Priorities Memo,
DHS is performing a sleight of hand. If people with DUIs continue to be such a
large part of the removal pie, then PEP’s data will show that the government is
doing what they said they would do—deporting priority “criminal aliens.” Nothing will necessarily have to change in terms of ICE’s actual practice—they are already deporting those convicted of DUIs in high numbers—but DHS will be able
to respond to the criticism that they are arresting the wrong people, because PEP
has now named those convicted of DUIs as the right kind of “criminal alien” target.
The current immigration system relies on low-level, local ICE employees
to make calls about who to detain and deport, and it remains unclear how effectively centralized guidance from higher-ups (in the form of memoranda like the
Executive Actions) will trickle down to local offices.150 Even if the guidance
does not trickle down, if ICE officers continue to target who they have already

146.
147.
148.
149.

Id.
Secure Communities and ICE Deportation: A Failed Program?, supra note 122.
Id.
For a discussion of entry and reentry offenses, see Chacón, supra note 13, at 637–39; see also García
Hernández, supra note 107, at 1472–73 (describing the steady increase in entry and reentry
deportations throughout the Bush Administration and continuing throughout the Obama
Administration).
150. See Julia Preston, Agents’ Union Stalls Training on Deportation Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/08/us/illegal-immigrants-who-commit-crimes-focus-ofdeportation.html [http://perma.cc/ALW9-6F5H].
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been targeting, the numbers will support a shift from S-Comm to PEP that
appears responsive to the S-Comm critics’ concerns, simply because DHS has
recategorized the largest group of people who were facing detention after
non-immigration arrests, those arrested for DUIs, as a proper target.
This recalibration of policy that allows DHS’s rhetoric to reflect its existing
practice, and thereby avoid actual reform, is a familiar move for the agency. A
2014 exposé by journalist Garrett M. Graff revealed that when faced with congressional pressure to account for the high levels of corruption within the ranks of
Border Patrol agents, DHS simply recalibrated how it measured corruption:
In Obama’s first year, [Customs and Border Protection] and DHS
leadership even ordered the agency to change its definition of “corruption” to downplay the number of total incidents. Instead, according to
internal affairs official Wong, the agency began to differentiate between
“mission-compromising corruption”—bribery, narcotics-smuggling or
human-smuggling allegations—and “non-mission-compromising corruption,” a “lesser” category of cases that included things like employees’ sexually assaulting detainees or workplace theft. Only the
“mission-compromising” problems, the agency now decreed, would be
reported to Congress. (Even rape and attempted murder . . . wouldn’t
have to be disclosed.) The distinction helped them wipe nearly a third
of the corruption cases out of statistics.151

The Secure Communities Memo promises to collect and analyze data
from the new PEP to root out “inappropriate use to support or engage in biased
policing.”152 In line with past practice, DHS will continue gathering data on removals of “criminal aliens.”153 The ordered recalibration of the definition of
corruption achieved congressionally acceptable, lower levels of Border Patrol corruption. Likewise, the recalibration of the term “criminal alien” to include those
with DUIs, who already face removal at high numbers, under the new category
significant misdemeanor, will serve to achieve acceptably high levels of the removals of “criminal aliens.”
The Secure Communities Memo also announced that ICE officers should
focus their efforts on seeking custody of those who have already been convicted,

151. Garrett M. Graff, The Green Monster: How the Border Patrol Became America’s Most Out-of-Control

Law Enforcement Agency, POLITICO (Nov./Dec. 2014), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/
2014/10/border-patrol-the-green-monster-112220_full.html [http://perma.cc/RT9T-97CD].
152. Secure Communities Memo, supra note 29, at 3.
153. Id. at 2.
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not merely those who have been arrested, as was happening under S-Comm.154
Again, because of the difficulty of making the ICE reforms at the top trickle
down to local agents, it is hard to know how this directive will play out in the
field. Nevertheless, because the key element of S-Comm (the information transfer of local law enforcement’s fingerprints to the FBI, then to DHS databases)
happens at the time of arrest, noncitizens will be on ICE’s radar whether or not
they are convicted. The Secure Communities Memo leaves the first of S-Comm’s
two goals—identifying noncitizens in criminal custody for transfer to ICE—
untouched.155 Having overcome local resistance to this full information sharing
and having activated S-Comm everywhere, the Executive Branch appears loath to
disturb the perfect merger of local arrest information with federal immigration databases. Indeed, the Memo directs ICE to “continue to rely on fingerprint-based
biometric data submitted during bookings by state and local law enforcement
agencies to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for criminal background
checks.”156 Because this information is transferred at the time of arrest, the fact
that the Secure Communities Memo directs ICE to wait until an arrested person
is convicted before seeking them out will be of little comfort to noncitizens who
have survived by steering clear of immigration authorities. It remains to be seen
whether ICE will actually wait until individuals are convicted before seeking their
transfer, once they know that a noncitizen is in local criminal custody. Given the
enormous variance in local practice by ICE officers, the Memo’s shift to the language of “conviction” rather than “arrest” is unlikely to trickle down completely to
local practice.
Critique 2: Local Law Enforcement Unnecessarily Cooperated With ICE
The second set of critiques of S-Comm focused on the cooperation of local
law enforcement with ICE. Advocates criticized local law enforcement for
handing over noncitizens to ICE custody after they were identified through the
forced information sharing. As S-Comm was activated in county after county,
long-time immigration advocates who had already been tracking the Criminal
Alien Program, as well as advocates alarmed by the new program, began to target

154. See id. (“[U]nless the alien poses a demonstrable risk to national security, enforcement actions

through the new program will only be taken against aliens who are convicted of specifically
enumerated crimes.”).
155. See id. (instead of S-Comm, “ICE should put in its place a program that will continue to rely on
fingerprint-based biometric data submitted during bookings by state and local law enforcement
agencies to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for criminal background checks.”).
156. Id.
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the immigration detainer.157 By campaigning around the voluntary nature of the
immigration detainer or “ICE hold,” immigration advocates sought to render SComm ineffectual.158 By convincing local law enforcement that they were under
no obligation to comply with ICE holds, and encouraging them to stop doing so
using both legal159 and policy arguments,160 advocates sought to attack the mechanism that translated a match in the immigration databases into a detention and a
removal order.
Advocacy on ICE detainers was successful in many jurisdictions, with cities,
counties, and in some cases, entire states limiting their cooperation with ICE in
holding noncitizens.161 While advocates used some of the same arguments about
the overbroad application of S-Comm against people who had either not been
convicted or been convicted of low-level offenses in arguing for detainer reform
on the local level, they also focused on the argument that cooperation with federal
immigration law enforcement damaged the relationships between immigrant
157. For a broader description of the Criminal Alien Program and immigration, see supra notes 114–116

158.

159.
160.
161.

and accompanying text. See Legal Bulletin, BROWARD CTY. SHERIFF’S OFFICE (June 19, 2012),
http://www.ailasouthflorida.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Broward-Sheriff-Legal-BulletinICE-Detainers.pdf [http://perma.cc/26R3-4HVK] (declining to honor ICE detainers unless
supported by probable cause in Broward County, Florida); see also Letter from Timothy P. Ryan,
Miami-Dade Corr. & Rehab. Dep’t. to Marc Jeffrey Moore, Field Off. Dir., U.S. Dep’t. of
Homeland Sec., Changes to Federal Detainer Procedures (Jan. 7, 2014), http://www.ailasouthflorida.
org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/2014.01.07-Implementation-of-Miami-Dade-Detainer-Policy2.pdf [http://perma.cc/BE46-9DFV] (honoring ICE detainer requests only with written agreement
from the federal government to reimburse for all costs related to compliance, and where the inmate
has a previous conviction for a forcible felony as defined by Florida law, or the inmate is pending a
charge of a nonbondable offense); Andy Reid, Palm Beach County Sheriff Agrees to Curtail
Immigration Jailings, SUN SENTINEL (July 22, 2014), http://www.ailasouthflorida.org/wp-content/
uploads/2014/01/2014.01.07-Implementation-of-Miami-Dade-Detainer-Policy-2.pdf [http://per
ma.cc/3RX3-RLZC] (Sheriff Bradshaw of Palm Beach County stopped automatically complying
with federal detainer requests in response to demands from a coalition of Palm Beach religious
congregations.).
See LENA GRABER, NAT’L IMMIGR. PROJECT OF THE NAT’L LAWYER’S GUILD, THE ALL-INONE GUIDE TO DEFEATING ICE HOLD REQUESTS (A.K.A. IMMIGRATION DETAINERS) 10,
(Ann Benson et al. eds., 2012) (emphasizing the optional nature of ICE hold requests, and the
discretion of local law enforcement).
For a list of lawsuits that halted ICE detainers, see Secure Communities Memo, supra note 29,
at 2 n.1.
See, e.g., Waslin, supra note 115, at 8–9 (analyzing DHS deportation records under S-Comm to
conclude that, although the stated goal of the program was to prioritize deportations, in practice the
program casts too wide a net, often deporting low-level offenders or those with no criminal charges).
California, Connecticut, and Maryland adopted statewide laws, policies, or both, limiting
cooperation with ICE holds, as did some of the most populous counties in the United States,
including Cook County (Illinois), Miami-Dade County (Florida), King County (Washington), and
Orange County (California), as well as the District of Columbia. For a list of states, cities, and
counties who limited cooperation with ICE holds, see Challenge Unjust Immigration Detainers,
NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CTR., http://www.immigrantjustice.org/detainers [http://perma.cc/6
FPJ-LPP9] (last visited Jan. 5, 2016).
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communities and local law enforcement.162 Particularly in jurisdictions that
claimed to espouse community policing tactics, advocates argued that immigrants would be less likely to call the police to report crimes when contact with
local law enforcement served as a conduit to immigration detention.163 Advocacy also focused on the chilling effect on immigrant survivors of violence, for
whom the police-ICE partnerships purportedly acted as another barrier to accessing supportive services from the police.164
Anti–S-Comm lawmakers and their supporters introduced and passed the
Trust Act in California, legislation that in its very name called for a restoration of
the trust between immigrant communities and the police that police-ICE collaboration had theoretically torn asunder.165 The bill drastically limited the situations
in which local law enforcement would transfer noncitizens from local custody to
ICE custody on the basis of ICE detainers.166 Law enforcement proved susceptible to Trust Act advocacy, as one of the primary talking points—that immigrant
communities should not be discouraged from cooperating with the police—
ultimately served to reinforce police officers’ legitimacy as those most properly
tasked with protecting and serving their communities. In other jurisdictions,
and occasionally within the same jurisdiction, advocates focused not only on
the police-immigrant trust arguments, but on an opposite argument: Advocates
warned that having a direct conduit to immigration enforcement created racial
profiling that led to pretextual arrests of Latinos and others profiled as immigrants, as well as their resulting transfer to immigration custody.167
While the Secure Communities Memo acknowledges the criticisms of the
S-Comm program, it does not explicitly name troubled relationships between
162. Waslin, supra note 115, at 12. (“[S-Comm] raises questions about local police authorities’ ability to

163.
164.
165.

166.
167.

build strong, trusting relationships with their communities. If a police agency cannot assure its
immigrant community that there will be no immigration consequences to providing information or
cooperating with police, immigrants will be less likely to come forward to report crimes, making
the job of police more difficult.”).
Waslin, supra note 115, at 12.
See Radha Vishnuvajjala, Insecure Communities: How an Immigration Enforcement Program Encourages
Battered Women to Stay Silent, 32 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 185, 194 (2012).
Assemb. B. 1081, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ca. 2011) (“The [S-Comm] program and immigration
detainers harm community policing efforts because immigrant residents who are victims or witnesses
to crime, including domestic violence, are less likely to report crime or cooperate with law
enforcement when any contact with law enforcement could result in deportation.”).
See id.
These arguments were not exclusive to opposition to S-Comm. S-Comm received disproportionate
attention as the newest iteration of police-ICE collaboration, but advocates also made similar
arguments about the effect of the long-active Criminal Alien Program (the low-tech version of SComm) and of the more recent 287(g) agreements (agreements that empowered local law
enforcement to act as immigration authorities for certain limited purposes). See Hesson, supra
note 119.
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local police and immigrant communities as part of the impetus. Nevertheless, the
agency announced a change in detainer policy, clarifying that instead of detainer
requests, ICE will instead issue requests for notification: “Requests that state or
local law enforcement notify ICE of a pending release during the time that person is otherwise in custody or under state or local authority.”168 These requests
presumably will trigger ICE action in picking up the person upon their release.
Advocates have already begun warning immigrant communities that this
might translate into ICE rounding up immigrants at the gates of local jails, or
in their homes and workplaces.169 It remains unclear how local jurisdictions
will react to the notification requests, but this development mirrors what was
already occurring in jurisdictions that had refused to detain immigrants for
ICE. Attorneys in California, where the Trust Act curtailed local law enforcement’s cooperation with detainers, have warned that ICE had already begun adjusting their tactics to the new reality of detainer reform even before the
announcement of the Executive Actions by targeting noncitizens for arrest and
detention immediately upon their release from jail.170 In other jurisdictions, ICE
has used the booking information gleaned from local jails through S-Comm to
pick up individuals in their own homes.171 The Secure Communities Memo
thus seems to be ICE’s attempt to implement nationally the strategies it was already developing locally to make the most of the information gathered from the
now fully operational information sharing infrastructure S-Comm put in place.
The tremendous gains that have been made by advocates pushing to alter ICE
detainer policies will only be maintained if local law enforcement treats detainer
requests as identical to notification requests, but how jurisdictions will respond
in practice remains to be seen.
C.

The Deferred Action Memo

The aspect of the November 2014 Immigration Executive Actions that has
received the most attention from policymakers, advocates, and the media appears
in the memo titled, “Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children and with Respect to Certain
Individuals Who Are the Parents of U.S. Citizens or Permanent Residents”
168. Secure Communities Memo, supra note 29, at 2.
169. See, e.g., Organizer Alert: Life After “PEP-Comm”, IMMIGRANT LEGAL RESOURCE CTR. 3 (2015),

http://www.ilrc.org/files/documents/ilrc_organizers_advisory-2015-01_06.pdf [http://perma.cc/94
Y3-U53F] (warning communities of increased ICE presence at “jails, courthouses, and homes”).
170. Interview with Ann Benson, Directing Attorney, Wash. Def. Ass’n. Immigr. Project (on file with
author).
171. Id.
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(hereinafter Deferred Action Memo).172 This Memo announced an expansion
of the current Deferred Action for Childhood Arrival (DACA) program and
the creation of the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA) program.173 Estimates vary, but of the approximately
11 million undocumented persons believed to reside in the United States, approximately 5 million may qualify to register with the government under either
DAPA or expanded DACA.174
In June 2012, DHS announced the creation of the predecessor to this Executive Action, the original DACA.175 Immigration service providers immediately began preparations to assist eligible immigrant youth in applying for the relief.
USCIS, the subagency of DHS charged with administering the benefit, had
received 727,164 applications as of December 31, 2014, denying 38,597 and
approving 638,897.176 Having learned from the DACA experience, immigrant
advocates wasted no time after the November 20, 2014, announcement to create
coalitions focused on preparing for the implementation of the announced programs.177 Advocates are poised to assist as many individuals as possible in applying
for the benefits of the expanded DACA and the newly created DAPA, in an attempt to provide protection from deportation to the millions who might qualify.178
Large grants by foundations are structured to specifically assist in DAPA and expanded DACA implementation, and immigrant legal service providers are preparing for the large increase in workload in processing DAPA and expanded
DACA applications by recruiting and training volunteers and new staff.
However, these preparations have been put on hold by a lawsuit filed in federal district court seeking to stop the implementation of DAPA and expanded
DACA.179 Twenty-six states joined in the case, Texas v. USA, and on February
16, 2015, the District Court for the Southern District of Texas issued a temporary injunction. The injunction blocked DHS from accepting applications for

172. See Deferred Action Memo, supra note 30.
173. See id.
174. Executive Actions on Immigration, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/im

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

migrationaction [http://perma.cc/PRT8-ZSY6] (last updated Apr. 15, 2015) (estimating that 4.9
million undocumented individuals may qualify for relief under DACA and Deferred Action for
Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA)).
See Deferred Action Memo, supra note 30.
The rest of the applications remained pending. See Neufeld Decl. at 10, ¶ 23, Texas v. United
States, No. 14-CV-254 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 16, 2015), http://crimmigration.com/wp-content/uploads/
2015/01/Neufeld-declaration-1-30-15.pdf [http://perma.cc/9Z9V-AXU7].
See, e.g., About Administrative Relief, ADMIN. RELIEF RES. CTR., http://www.adminrelief.org/
about [http://perma.cc/87MK-2GT8] (last visited Jan. 5, 2016).
See id.
See Texas v. United States, No. B-14-254, 2015 LEXIS 18551 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 16, 2015).

630

63 UCLA L. REV. 594 (2016)

the expanded form of DACA (two days before the agency began adjudicating
them) and blocked DAPA implementation plans from moving forward.180 On
the government’s appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s refusal to
lift the preliminary injunction until the case is heard on the merits.181 The Department of Justice has requested that the Supreme Court review the Fifth Circuit's decision to block the implementation of DAPA and Expanded DACA.182
If the Supreme Court decides the case before June 2016, the Obama Administration will have a few months to implement the new programs. If not, Obama's successor may decide to either continue pursuing the DAPA and expanded DACA
or may abandon them altogether. While the failure of a previous attempt to block
deferred action through a similar lawsuit in 2012 indicates that the plaintiffs are
unlikely to prevail in the courts, the delay in implementation caused by the lawsuit
points to an uncertain future for DAPA and expanded DACA.183
The fight over the implementation of DAPA and expanded DACA, as well
as the ongoing preparations to help eligible individuals apply,184 emphasize the
benefits individuals could receive from these programs. Detractors consider
the programs an executive amnesty, while supporters highlight the way the programs will allow undocumented youth and parents to “come out of the shadows”
and receive work permits.185 Viewing DAPA and expanded DACA through this
180. See id.
181. See Texas v. United States, No. 15-40238, 2015 WL 3386436 (5th Cir. May 26, 2015).
182. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, United States v. Texas, No. 15-674 (U.S. Nov. 20, 2015),

http://immigrationimpact.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/US-v.-Texas-Petition.pdf [https://
web.archive.org/web/20160105164341/http://immigrationimpact.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/
11/US-v.-Texas-Petition.pdf].
183. See Crane v. Napolitano, 920 F. Supp. 2d 724 (N.D. Tex. 2013) (ICE agents lacked standing to
bring suit against DHS officials to challenge the constitutional and statutory validity of a directive
and memorandum promulgated by officials that changed ICE deportation procedures and
prosecutorial discretion); see also Molly Hennessy-Fiske, Advocates Urge Immigrants Not to Be
Deterred by Ruling Blocking Obama Plan, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/
nation/nationnow/la-na-immigration-lawsuit-applications-daca-dapa-20150217-story.html
[http://perma.cc/Q65F-NGN8] (reporting that DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson issued a statement in
response to the preliminary injunction in Texas v. United States, claiming “we fully expect to
ultimately prevail in the courts, and we will be prepared to implement DAPA and expanded DACA
once we do”).
184. See id.
185. See Marc A. Thiessen, How to Push Back on Obama’s Executive Amnesty, WASH. POST (Dec. 1,
2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/marc-thiessen-how-to-push-back-on-obamasexecutive-amnesty/2014/12/01/b1a494f2-7963-11e4-84d4-7c896b90abdc_story.html [http://per
ma.cc/WBD7-V75E] (characterizing the executive action as “de facto amnesty” and “executive
amnesty”); see also Eli Saslow, Conservative Expert on Immigration Law to Pursue Suit Against
Executive Action, WASH. POST (Nov. 22, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/
2014/11/22/f6d2b3fe-728a-11e4-ad12-3734c461eab6_story.html [http://perma.cc/R63B-FN3Z]
(Kansas Secretary of State Kris Kobach characterizing the executive action as “imperial, executive
amnesty” and “[t]he sacrificial shredding of our Constitution”).

Challenging the “Criminal Alien” Paradigm

631

lens functions to separate the program from the parts of the Executive Actions—
including the Priorities Memo and the Secure Communities Memo—that are
focused on enforcement. The Deferred Action Memo itself, however, makes
clear that enforcement lies at the heart of deferred action; the goal of DAPA and
expanded DACA is to remove certain persons from ICE and CBP’s crosshairs
because “DHS and its Components cannot respond to all immigration violations
or remove all persons illegally in the United States.”186 In other words, the sharpened enforcement that the Priority Memo and the Secure Communities Memo
establish relies on the Deferred Action Memo: USCIS’s exercises of prosecutorial
discretion to those deemed deserving is the flipside to the hypercriminalization of
the millions left out of the protections of DAPA and expanded DACA. For these
reasons, an examination of the criminal alien-generating aspects of the Executive
Actions demands an analysis of DAPA and expanded DACA through an enforcement lens.
1.

DAPA and Expanded DACA: Who Qualifies?

DAPA and expanded DACA, viewed broadly as the Executive Actions’
wins for immigrant communities, have the capacity to temporarily move entire
categories of unauthorized migrants out of ICE’s clutches.187 As a result of these
programs, two categories of migrants (youth arrivals and parents of U.S. citizens
and Lawful Permanent Residents) have been deemed unsuitable targets for detention or deportation for the time being. The November 2014 Executive Actions
built upon the original large-scale implementation of prosecutorial discretion by
the Obama Administration, the June 2012 announcement of the original
DACA.188 Under the first version of DACA, people who were under the age of
31 as of June 2012, who had entered the United States under the age of 16, and
whose entry had occurred before June 15, 2007, could qualify for DACA.189 Except for limited circumstances, only those age 15 and over could apply to USCIS,
and proof of enrollment or graduation from high school or a GED program was
required.190 The Deferred Action Memo upgraded DACA by removing the age
cap on the program: under the new program, as long as a person was under the
age of 16 before they entered, being over the age of 31 would no longer serve to
186. Deferred Action Memo, supra note 30, at 1.
187. See Lucy Westcott, Undocumented Immigrants and Advocates Welcome Obama’s Executive Action at

Viewing Party, NEWSWEEK (Nov. 21, 2014), http://www.newsweek.com/undocumented-immi
grants-and-advocates-welcome-obamas-executive-action-285997 [http://perma.cc/SG8F-LLYL].
188. See Deferred Action Memo, supra note 30.
189. Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), supra note 38.
190. See id.
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disqualify them.191 This change is thought to potentially qualify 300,000 more
individuals for the program.192
The primary benefits of expanded DACA are a three-year award of work
authorization and the knowledge that for those three years, the DACA recipient
will not be a priority for deportation—that is, unless she comes into contact with
the criminal system and triggers one of the categories in the Priorities Memo.193
The work authorization document qualifies an individual for a social security
number, and allows the DACA recipient access to employment and educational
opportunities previously closed to her, as well as the possibility of travel outside the
country if she receives advance permission to return.194 DACA recipients are
considered lawfully present, but, as the memo makes clear, DACA is not a
legal status, and confers “no substantive right, immigration status or pathway to
citizenship.”195
DAPA provides the same benefits, but rather than qualifying individuals
on the basis of their childhood arrivals in the United States, DAPA’s benefits accrue to those unauthorized migrants who have U.S. citizen or Lawful Permanent
Resident children.196 Like recipients of expanded DACA, applicants must
have resided in the United States since January 1, 2010.197 The factors that
disqualify individuals from receiving DAPA and expanded DACA are slightly
different, but both programs would disqualify those convicted of a broad range of
criminal offenses.198 The disqualifying factors for DAPA demonstrate the close
191. Deferred Action Memo, supra note 30, at 3.
192. President Obama’s Immigration Announcement, NAT’L IMMIGR. LAW CTR. (Nov. 26, 2014), http://
193.
194.

195.
196.
197.
198.

www.nilc.org/execactionsummary.html [http://perma.cc/J7T5-2W53] (estimating approximately
300,000 will qualify under the expanded version of DACA).
As explained infra, detention and deportation can still occur if the DACA recipient has an encounter
with law enforcement.
See Social Security Number and Card—Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, SOC. SEC. ADMIN.,
http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/deferred_action.pdf [http://perma.cc/J9QM-G74Z] (last visited Jan. 5,
2015) (Social Security Number eligibility under DACA); see also Frequently Asked Questions, U.S.
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/consideration-deferredact ion-childhood-arrivals-process/frequently-asked-questions [http://perma.cc/NE2L-4FZZ]
(last updated June 15, 2015) (ability to travel outside United States under DACA).
Deferred Action Memo, supra note 30, at 5.
See id. at 4.
See id.
See id. at 3; see also Practice Advisory for Criminal Defenders: New “Deferred Action for Parental
Accountability” (DAPA) Immigration Program Announced by President Obama, IMMIGRANT LEGAL
RES. CTR. & NAT’L IMMIGR. PROJECT OF THE NAT’L LAWYERS GUILD 1 (Nov. 24, 2014),
http://www.nationalimmigrationproject.org/legalresources/practice_advisories/pa_ar-dapa-criminal
-defender-advisory-11_25_2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/XZE9-29E5] (“Both DAPA and DACA
are barred by conviction of any felony, a ‘significant’ misdemeanor, or three misdemeanors.
However, even here there are differences, for example in the definition of what constitutes a
felony and misdemeanor.”); Understanding the Criminal Bars to the Deferred Action Policy for
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connection between the Priorities Memo and the Deferred Action Memo. Rather than list out the disqualifying factors individually, the Deferred Action
Memo directly incorporates the Priorities Memo, stating that individuals who
“are not an enforcement priority as reflected in the November 20, 2014 Policies
for the Apprehension, Detention and Removal of Undocumented Immigrants
Memorandum” may be eligible for DAPA.199 As explained in Part I.A, supra,
the significant misdemeanor category, first created as a disqualifying factor for
the original DACA, reappears in the Priorities Memo, and thus is also integrated into the structure of DAPA.
2.

DAPA and Expanded DACA in Context: The Executive’s Back-End
Power Over Immigration

Analyzing the links between DAPA and expanded DACA and the immigration enforcement regime requires a consideration of the ways in which
the delegation of immigration authority to the Executive Branch contributes to
these links. The prevailing wisdom holds that Congress, through its authority
over the creation and expansion of the immigration code, decides the categories
of immigrants allowed to enter and remain in the United States.200 However, as
tracked by Cristina Rodriguez and Adam Cox, the expansion of the immigration code by Congress has “had the counterintuitive consequences of delegating
tremendous authority to the President to set immigration screening policy by
making a huge fraction of noncitizens deportable at the option of the Executive.”201 Because millions of noncitizens are deportable at the option of the
President, this functionally gives the Executive Branch the power “to exert control over the number and types of immigrants inside the United States.”202 This
power is exercised at the back end of the system, “through the exercise of prosecutorial discretion with respect to whom to deport, rather than at the front end of
the system, through decisions about whom to admit.”203 This “de facto delegation” ends up giving the Executive “vast discretion to shape immigration policy by

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Childhood Arrivals, IMMIGRANT LEGAL RESOURCE CTR. (Oct. 2012), http://www.ilrc.org/files/
documents/ilrcunderstanding_criminal_bars_to_deferred_action_5.pdf [http://perma.cc/D4EQ-V
9HH] (discussing applicable criminal convictions under DACA).
Deferred Action Memo, supra note 30, at 4.
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972) (quoting Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Stranahan,
214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909)) (finding that over no area is the legislative power more complete than
immigration).
Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458,
463 (2009).
Id.
Id. at 464.
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deciding how (and over which types of immigrants) to exercise the option to deport.”204 This power has been concentrated in ICE officials, who are responsible
for deciding whom to detain and charge as removable.205
The November 2014 Executive Actions appear designed to further consolidate this authority. The Priorities Memo clarifies whom ICE will target,
and the Deferred Action Memo outlines the parameters of whom will be
spared. It makes no difference that DAPA and expanded DACA will be managed through USCIS, the branch of the immigration authority that grants benefits; the population-level exercise of prosecutorial discretion nonetheless shapes
the form and size of the undocumented population in the United States at the
whim of the President. The line between USCIS and ICE is a fluid one. The
threat of handing over rejected DAPA and expanded DACA applications to
ICE for enforcement remains present, and, more importantly, those who do not
or cannot apply for these programs will be more firmly under ICE’s purview.
Moreover, by creating the significant misdemeanor ground, discussed in
Part I.A, supra, the President is further shoring up immigration power in the Executive. There is no statutory basis (and thus no legislative review or approval) of
the category, but it nonetheless creates a new group of appropriate “criminal alien” targets for deportation. This expansion of categories of appropriately deportable noncitizens is the flipside of the creation of DAPA and expanded
DACA, programs that carve out a less appropriately deportable segment of the
noncitizen population.
3.

DACA and DAPA Theorized

The original creation of DACA in 2012 and its expansion in November 2014
provided a lifeline for the immigrant youth who have organized since 2001 for
the passage of successive versions of the DREAM Act, a bill that would provide lawful status for noncitizen youth.206 The original DACA program falls
far short of the promises of the DREAM Act, and is considered by many to
be a placeholder until the bill can win passage, either as a standalone bill or as
part of a broader comprehensive immigration reform package. Although it is not

204. Id. at 511.
205. See id. at 519.
206. See Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act, S. 1291, 107th Cong. (2001) (the

first DREAM Act introduced in 2001); Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act
of 2003, S. 1545, 108th Cong. (2003) (the second attempt at the DREAM Act); Development,
Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act of 2007, S. 2205, 110th Cong. (2007) (the third
attempt at the DREAM Act); see also Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act, S.
729, 111th Cong. § 3 (2009).
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the DREAM Act, much of the framing of DACA closely mirrors that surrounding DREAM Act advocacy.207
Amalia Pallares has laid out what she calls the “neoliberal rationality” that has
prevailed in public discussion of the DREAM Act, which stands in contrast with
immigrant youth advocacy centering community, family, fairness, and equality.208
The same neoliberal rationality is in full view in the official narratives around the
creation and now expansion of DACA. DACA recipients emerge as the ideal neoliberal actors: framed as exceptional, required to perform the myth of selfreliance, driven to show that they are self-propelled and can achieve their own
economic viability, and exempting the state and private industry from social support.209 The federal government has made clear that DACA recipients’ independence must be absolute—they do not qualify for medical insurance through
the Affordable Care Act, nor do they qualify for federal financial aid that might
assist them.210 Despite having to go it alone, they are also valued for their potential
economic contributions. The President highlighted this valorization of immigrant youths’ latent productivity, seamlessly linking it to American exceptionalism
in his November 21st remarks supporting the November 20th Executive Actions:
We’re constantly being replenished with strivers who believe in the
American Dream. And it gives us a tremendous advantage over other
nations. It makes us entrepreneurial. It continues the promise that
here in America, you can make it if you try, regardless of where you
come from, regardless of the circumstances of your birth.211

As projected through the DACA program, immigrant youth are simultaneously
valued for their ability to advance without assistance and for their potential economic contributions—contributions that would generate more pure profit for the
United States given that these youth will have to subsidize their own advanced
schooling and healthcare.

207. This Part is animated by the insights of political scientist Amalia Pallares, in her close examination
208.
209.
210.

211.

of the framing of DREAM Act advocacy in her book, AMALIA PALLARES, FAMILY ACTIVISM:
IMMIGRANT STRUGGLES AND THE POLITICS OF NONCITIZENSHIP (2015).
Id. at 104.
See id. at 106.
See Immigration Status and the Marketplace, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/
immigrants/immigration-status [https://perma.cc/VW8D-8DAV] (last visited Jan. 5, 2016)
(clarifying that recipients of DACA do not qualify for the Affordable Care Act “Marketplace”); see
also Questions and Answers: Financial Aid and Undocumented Students, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (May
2014), https://studentaid.ed.gov/sites/default/files/financial-aid-and-undocumented-students.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R9VH-QSQF] (clarifying that DACA students are not eligible for federal
financial aid).
Nov. 21, 2014 Obama Remarks, supra note 24.
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While the rationales surrounding DACA appear to valorize the potential of
its recipients as individual advancers of American exceptionalism, DAPA occupies
a different niche. In one respect, the creation of DAPA falls squarely in line with
the historical valorization of family reunification in U.S. immigration law and policy.212 At least since the passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952,
“there has been an immigration norm that prioritizes family reunification in cases
of family members abroad, and family unity in cases of families who reside in the
United States.”213 While more recent changes in immigration law have drastically
increased deportations and curtailed options for legalization, family unity remains,
at least in theory, one of the pillars of the immigration system.
The focus on family unity, however, does not value all families equally.
DAPA valorizes the unity of families that include U.S. citizen or Lawful Permanent Resident children. For families that do not include U.S.-born children,
the principle of family unity seems not to apply, as evinced by the exclusion of parents of DACA recipients from eligibility for relief. This can be linked to the way
that DAPA valorizes innocence. Whereas with DACA the innocence of immigrant youth who came to the United States “through no fault of their own” is centered, DAPA valorizes the innocence of U.S.-born children who are not to blame
for their parents’ action. By offering protection from deportation to their parents,
these U.S.-born children are protected. Their birth in the United States appears
to trump their parents’ wrongdoing, and their potential suffering (in the case
of their parents’ deportation) counts in a way that the suffering of an undocumented youth (or even a DACA recipient) losing a parent to deportation does
not. The value of DAPA applicants thus lies in part in their role as the creators
and caretakers of that most valuable form of life—U.S. bodies born on U.S. soil.
This selective focus on family unity is particularly stark given the current
expansion of “family detention”—a euphemism for the incarceration of immigrant women with their young children during the pendency of their removal
proceedings.214 Those detained in family detention centers primarily consist of

212. For an in-depth overview of the historical recognition of family in immigration and citizenship law,

see Kerry Abrams & R. Kent Piacenti, Immigration’s Family Values, 100 VA. L. REV. 629, 655–64
(2014).
213. PALLARES, supra note 207, at 25.
214. See, e.g., ICE’s New Family Detention Center in Dilley, Texas to Open in December, U.S. IMMIGR. &
CUSTOMS ENF’T (Nov. 17, 2014), https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/ices-new-family-deten
tion-center-dilley-texas-open-december [https://perma.cc/2PGJ-5PMG] (“The South Texas
Residential Center in Dilley is the fourth facility the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
has used to increase its capacity to detain and expedite the removal of adults with children who
illegally crossed the Southwest border.”).
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recent arrivals apprehended while attempting to cross the U.S.-Mexico border.215
Their recent arrival marks them as ineligible for the potential protections of
DAPA or DACA.216 The dire conditions at the Artesia, New Mexico family detention facility, where the average age of children was 6.5 years old,217 involved
grossly inadequate healthcare, educational support, and legal support.218 Attorneys visiting their clients described sick, malnourished children and desperate
mothers housed in barracks reminiscent of the Japanese internment camps.219
While the Artesia facility has now closed, it has been replaced by the largest immigration detention center in the United States in Dilley, Texas, designed to
house exclusively women and their children, with a capacity of 2400 migrants.220
The simultaneous expansion in the use of criminal alien requirement (CAR)
facilities—federal prisons housing exclusively immigrants, mostly men who are
prosecuted for either entering or reentering the United States unlawfully—
completes this picture.221 The estimated 90,000 deportations of parents each year
translate increasingly into criminal convictions for illegal reentry for many of those
who attempt to return.222 A recent study found that the risk of incarceration does
not deter those trying to return to their family members, guaranteeing a continued pool of bodies for the privately owned CAR prisons.223 During his announcement of the Executive Actions, the President asked, “Are we a nation that
215. Id.; see also, AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, FAMILY IMMIGRATION

216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

DETENTION: WHY THE PAST CANNOT BE PROLOGUE (2015), http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/publications/commission_on_immigration/FINAL%20ABA%20Family%20D
etention%20Report%208-19-15.authcheckdam.pdf [http://perma.cc/AMZ5-R4L9] (analyzing
the U.S. government's decision, as a policy matter, to detain women and children fleeing to the
United States to seek protection).
See Deferred Action Memo, supra note 30, at 4 (requiring individuals to have arrived before January
1, 2010, in order to qualify for DAPA or expanded DACA relief).
Vicki B. Gaubeca, Stop Warehousing Immigrant Mothers and Children, ALBUQUERQUE JOURNAL
(Aug. 28, 2014, 12:02 AM), http://www.abqjournal.com/453083/opinion/stop-warehousing-im
migrant-mothers-and-children.html [http://perma.cc/QN7C-YUUX].
Expose and Close, DETENTION WATCH NETWORK (Sept. 2014), http://www.detentionwatch
network.org/sites/detentionwatchnetwork.org/files/expose_close_-_artesia_family_residential_
center_nm_2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/CCS4-GGQB].
Grassroots Leadership Condemns Expansion of For-Profit Family Detention Centers, GRASSROOTS
LEADERSHIP (Nov. 18, 2014), http://grassrootsleadership.org/releases/2014/11/grassroots-leader
ship-condemns-expansion-profit-family-detention-centers [http://perma.cc/9NP4-BAMT].
Julia Preston, Detention Center Presented as Deterrent to Border Crossings, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
15, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/16/us/homeland-security-chief-opens-largestimmigration-detention-center-in-us.html [http://perma.cc/EQ6U-DG2W].
Warehoused and Forgotten, ACLU 2–3 (June 2014), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assetcs/
060614-aclu-car-reportonline.pdf [https://perma.cc/6R4S-74UG].
Seth Freed Wessler, Nearly 250K Deportations of Parents of U.S. Citizens in Just Over Two Years,
COLORLINES (Dec. 17, 2012, 9:45 AM), http://colorlines.com/archives/2012/12/us_deports_more
_than_200k_parents.html [http://perma.cc/HV6C-QPJW].
See Hamilton, supra note 97.
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accepts the cruelty of ripping children from their parents’ arms?”224 The expansion of CAR facilities to house those attempting to return to their families seems
to answer this question in the affirmative. The valuing of family unity that
DAPA purports to advance must be theorized alongside the two attacks on the
family that family detention and CAR facilities represent.
DAPA’s justification is not limited to family unity. The value of immigrant parents as laborers appears central as well. Obama alluded to this in his
November 20th speech, asking, “Are we a nation that tolerates the hypocrisy of a
system where workers who pick our fruit and make our beds never have a chance
to get right with the law? Or are we a nation that gives them a chance to make
amends, take responsibility, and give their kids a better future?”225 In contrast to
the DACA-eligible youth, who appear to be valued for their potential contributions as America’s future producers, potential DAPA recipients are naturalized
both as caretakers of America’s future entrepreneurs, and as the workers at the
lowest ranks of the segmented labor market.226 Writing in 2009 about the President’s relationship to immigration law, Adam B. Cox and Cristina M.
Rodríguez foreshadowed this aspect of the Executive Actions, explaining that
the delegation of power on the enforcement side of immigration policy makes it
possible for the President, “without having to resort to the legislative process, to
alter significantly the composition of the immigrant labor force.”227 Thus, under
DAPA, the most malleable laborers would be given permission to stay, while the
rest are hypercriminalized and drawn into the detention to deportation pipeline.
The narratives around innocence, exceptionalism, and family unity that
bolster DAPA and both the original and the expanded DACA programs also
serve to mask the underlying policies that have resulted in an undocumented population of 11 million. At their core, DACA and DAPA are prosecutorial discretion programs, or attempts by the federal government to provide a case-by-case
evaluation of eligible individuals. The collective demands of immigrants are both
masked and nullified by the individualized forms of prosecutorial discretion that
DACA and DAPA represent. The worthiness of each applicant’s capacities and
productive potential, either as laborers and protectors of U.S. citizen or Lawful
Permanent Resident children (DAPA) or potential producers (DACA and expanded DACA) are grounded in a neoliberal perspective that measures each
applicant against the pre-approved narratives. While the decision to migrate is
a personal one, the factors pushing individuals to attempt unauthorized crossings
224.
225.
226.
227.

President Barack Obama, supra note 2.
Id.
PALLARES, supra note 207, at 104.
Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 201, at 464.
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into the United States, and to remain in the United States if they cross successfully, are not. For example, the displacement of Mexican workers occasioned
by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),228 the land-grab-fueled
displacement of migrants from South America,229 and the poverty and gang violence leading to the so-called surge in Central American migrants’ arrivals during
the summer of 2014,230 are all masked by a rhetoric that views migration as an individual choice with individual, at-fault actors. The millions of potential individual exercises of prosecutorial discretion through DAPA and expanded DACA cast
a huge web of obfuscation over the root causes of migratory flows. As explained
below, they also serve to mask the unhampered growth of the immigration enforcement apparatus, of which these programs are an integral part.
4.

DAPA and Expanded DACA and the Production of the “Criminal Alien”

Generally speaking, the unauthorized migrants who might have thus far
avoided the immigration enforcement apparatus and the criminal justice system
are those most likely to submit their detailed applications to USCIS if the programs move forward. If they are properly informed, unauthorized migrants are
unlikely to apply for DAPA or expanded DACA if they have criminal convictions
that disqualify them from the relief and simultaneously make them priorities for
detention and removal.231 Immigrant advocacy organizations are attempting to
assure this outcome by offering preliminary public education about DAPA and
expanded DACA’s disqualifying factors, in the hopes of bringing down the number of people who will submit their information to USCIS without the guarantee
of the promised benefit.232 The vast majority of those who submitted applications

228. See DAVID BACON, ILLEGAL PEOPLE: HOW GLOBALIZATION CREATES MIGRATION AND

CRIMINALIZES IMMIGRANTS (2008).
229. See SASKIA SASSEN, EXPULSIONS: BRUTALITY AND COMPLEXITY IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY

(2014).
230. See Ana Gonzales-Barrera, Jens Manuel Krogstad & Mark Hugo Lopez, DHS: Violence, Poverty,

is Driving Children to Flee Central America to U.S., PEW RES. CTR. (July 1, 2014), http://www.
pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/07/01/dhs-violence-poverty-is-driving-children-to-flee-cent
ral-america-to-u-s [http://perma.cc/7W7Q-YU9W] (observing drastic increases in Honduran
and Salvadoran child migration in response to surges in gang and drug trafficking violence).
231. See, e.g., Jeanne Batalova, Sarah Hooker & Randy Capps, DACA at the Two-Year Mark: A National
and State Profile of Youth Eligible and Applying for Deferred Action, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. 5
(Aug. 2014), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/daca-two-year-mark-national-and-state-p
rofile-youth-eligible-and-applying-deferred-action [http://perma.cc/QT2R-PBWA].
232. See, e.g., Understanding the Criminal Bars to the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, IMMIGRANT
LEGAL RESOURCE CTR. (2012), http://www.ilrc.org/files/documents/ilrc-2012-daca_chart_1.pdf
[http://perma.cc/J3AN-VT9R] (providing a brief overview of how criminal history affects eligibility
for deferred action as a reference for applicants).
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to USCIS for the original DACA program qualified for the benefit,233 and the
same could be true of the enhanced DACA and the new DAPA if individuals receive accurate information and competent assistance with the application process.
The process of applying for deferred action involves the submission of a detailed form with extensive biographic data; the forms created for the first iteration
of DACA asked applicants to list every single address at which they have resided
since they arrived in the United States.234 More importantly, every person who
applies for DAPA or expanded DACA would be subject to a background check.
Upon submission of an application to USCIS, migrants would receive a notice
directing them to a biometrics capture appointment at their nearest USCIS
office.235 For many applicants whose survival has thus far depended on avoiding
detection by immigration authorities, this appointment will be the first time they
willingly enter a federal immigration facility. At the appointment, the applicants’
fingerprints and photographs will be taken.236 The background check is carried
out by running the fingerprints against available federal criminal and immigration
databases in an attempt to flag disqualifying factors such as past criminal records,
past deportations, or both.237 If the initial round of DACA applications are any
indication, most applicants will presumably clear this hurdle.
The captured biometric data will be used for purposes other than just a
background check, however. The information will enter the Automatic Biometric
Identification System (IDENT), a database that serves as “a central DHS-wide
system for storage and processing of biometric and associated biographic information for national security; law enforcement; immigration and border management; intelligence; background investigations for national security positions

233. This was clearly the case with the first iteration of deferred action (DACA), with a ratio of 638,897
234.

235.

236.
237.

applications approved to 38,597 denied. The rest of the applications remained pending. See Neufeld
Decl., supra note 176.
See U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) Form I-821D: Consideration of Deferred
Action for Childhood Arrivals, U.S. DEP’T. OF HOMELAND SEC. 2–3, http://www.uscis.gov/sites/
default/files/files/form/i-821d.pdf [http://perma.cc/769Z-TM8E] (form last updated June 4,
2014) (Part 2, “Residence and Travel Information,” requires each previous address since the
applicant arrived in the U.S.).
See Instructions for Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, U.S. DEP’T. OF
HOMELAND SEC. 3, http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/form/i-821dinstr.pdf [http://
perma.cc/5RRU-GQTL] (last updated June 4, 2014) (“Individuals requesting DACA must
provide fingerprints, photographs, and signatures (biometrics). You may receive a notice scheduling
you to appear at an Application Support Center (ASC) for biometrics collection.”).
Id.
See Privacy Impact Assessment Update for the Customer Identity Verification (CIV) System, U.S. DEP’T.
OF HOMELAND SEC. 3 (Apr. 26, 2010), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_
uscis_civupdate.pdf [http://perma.cc/C3GR-2LQQ] (detailing the background fingerprint-check
procedure).
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and certain positions of public trust; and associated testing, training, management reporting, planning and analysis, or other administrative uses.”238 IDENT
bridges the enforcement aspects and the benefits-granting aspects of the agency’s work by holding the records of all noncitizens fingerprinted by DHS,
whether they have been encountered for detention or deportation purposes, or for
purposes of obtaining lawful immigration status.239 All DAPA and expanded
DACA applicants’ information would be entered in IDENT and remain in the
database, past the expiration of the three-year deferred action period or the programs’ cancellation under future presidential administrations.
The potential capture of the data of millions of DAPA and expanded
DACA recipients in the IDENT database takes on particular weight when analyzed alongside the federal government’s complete integration of IDENT into efforts to apprehend and deport “criminal aliens.” The full activation of S-Comm in
every jurisdiction translates into any arrest of any person, citizen or noncitizen,
anywhere in the country, triggering a check against the fingerprints in the
IDENT database.240 As discussed in Part I.B, supra, this aspect of S-Comm will
remain unchanged in the newly created PEP. Most of those who apply for
DAPA and expanded DAPA would do so because they have no path to lawful
status in the United States. For those who managed to cross into the country
without encountering any border enforcement officials or without having been
fingerprinted or photographed by those officials, no record of their existence currently resides within federal immigration databases.241 If they were arrested by
local law enforcement, a search of the IDENT database would not reveal their
noncitizen status. Unless they are flagged as noncitizens some other way (for example, through an in-person interview conducted pursuant to the Criminal Alien

238. See Privacy Impact Assessment for the Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT), U.S.

DEP’T. OF HOMELAND SEC. 2 (Dec. 7, 2012), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publicat
ions/privacy/PIAs/privacy_pia_usvisit_ident_appendixj_jan2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/WXL9-VY
UU] (detailing procedure for IDENT checks).
239. See Cox & Miles, supra note 114, at 94 n.21.
240. See Secure Communities: Monthly Statistics Through August 31, 2014 IDENT/IAFIS Interoperability,
U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T 1, http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/sc-stats/nationwide_intero
p_stats-fy2014-to-date.pdf [http://perma.cc/2K6R-GVT2] (last visited Jan. 5, 2016) (all IDENT
matches removed, whether convicted or not).
241. See Hiroshi Motomura, The Discretion That Matters: Federal Immigration Enforcement, State and
Local Arrests, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1819, 1853 (2011) (“[O]f the 11.2
million unauthorized migrants in the United States, only a few are arrested. The 11.2 million
are somewhere within the borders of the United States, but the federal government does not know
exactly who they are or where they live or work.”); see also id. at 1828 (“[A]bout 6.7 million
unauthorized migrants—are believed to have entered without inspection at a port of entry.”).

642

63 UCLA L. REV. 594 (2016)

Program), they may be able to go through the criminal process without being
flagged for transferred to ICE custody.242
Now, however, any future encounters with law enforcement by DAPA or
expanded DACA recipients, whose data would then be in IDENT, could lead to
quick identification by immigration enforcement authorities and transfer to immigration custody. To avoid detection, DAPA and expanded DACA recipients
would need to remain above reproach in every area of their lives, a task that could
prove impossible for people of color, especially young men who may attract police
attention despite their best efforts to perform DAPA or expanded DACA levels
of respectability.243
In the worst case scenario for this population, a future administration may
choose not only to cancel the deferred action programs, but to use the information in IDENT to track down, detain, and deport those who have made their
presence known through their DAPA or expanded DACA applications.244 This
may prove politically unpopular, particularly if millions of individuals end up applying for and receiving these forms of relief. However, the mass deportations of
Operation Wetback in the 1950s (which included the rounding up of over a million people, including U.S. citizens of Mexican descent) demonstrate that this
outcome, while likely to prove controversial, is not politically impossible.245
This is not an argument for the millions who may qualify for deferred action
to remain in the shadows if the program moves forward. The decision of whether
or not to apply for DAPA or expanded DACA, even if one unquestionably qualifies for the relief, is a highly personal one. Coming out of the shadows to be
counted and accounted for, however, while it may bring the benefits of work authorization and a social security number, involves stepping into the potential net of
immigration enforcement. Voluntary entry into the IDENT database (one of the
primary mechanisms for producing “criminal aliens”) at a time when detention
242. Ingrid Eagly has tracked how local jurisdictions may handle knowledge of an arrestee’s lack of U.S.

citizenship differently depending on local attitudes toward unauthorized migration, with some
jurisdictions actively seeking to use this information to initiate immigration enforcement efforts, and
others seeking to ignore it. Eagly, supra note 10.
243. See Carbado & Harris, supra note 16 (arguing that the Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio and United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce effectively enables procedural racial profiling).
244. But see Motomura, supra note 241, at 1853–54 (“[T]he combination of the Gonzales rule, § 287(g)
agreements, and [S-Comm] can give the federal government more information about potentially
removable individuals than the federal enforcement apparatus can handle—either politically given
various constituencies opposed to certain types of enforcement, or practically given its limited
capacity.”).
245. See U.S. IMMIGR. & NATURALIZATION SERV. ANN. REP., at 31 (1954).; see also Giberto
Cardenas, United States Immigration Policy Toward Mexico: An Historical Perspective, 2 CHICANO L.
REV. 66, 81 (1975) (finding that during 1950s, as many as one-sixth of the total “Mexican-origin”
population in the United States was deported).
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and deportation are at an all-time high is a required tradeoff for the temporary
protections of DAPA or expanded DACA.
II.

NET WIDENING IN THE IMMIGRATION CONTEXT

The excesses of the carceral state have pierced public consciousness, and law
enforcement officials now routinely make pronouncements about the need to reconsider the strategies that have led the United States to become the world’s leading jailer.246 By contrast, in the immigration realm, the unprecedented resources
applied to both border and interior enforcement and the growth in detention
have not yet reached politically unpalatable levels.247 Still, the two million deportations benchmark surpassed by the Obama Administration in April 2014 generated a great deal of activism and backlash against the Executive’s enforcement
strategy.248 When the head of the National Council of La Raza, historically a
supporter of the Obama Administration, publicly called the President the “Deporter-in-Chief,” the President could no longer ignore the crisis.249

246. See, e.g., U.S. Attorney Gen. Eric Holder, Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the American Bar

Association’s House of Delegates (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorneygeneral-eric-holder-delivers-remarks-annual-meeting-american-bar-associations [http://perma.cc/
UTV7-JQ8Q] (acknowledging that “young black and Latino men are disproportionately likely to
become involved in our criminal justice system” and that “people of color often face harsher
punishment than their peers”); see also FBI Dir. James B. Comey, Remarks to Georgetown
University (Feb. 12, 2015), http://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/hard-truths-law-enforcement-andrace [https: //perma.cc/ZTJ7-8W55] (FBI Director James Comey recognized “hard truths” in the
aftermath of the fatal shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri. Comey acknowledged
that “at many points in American history, law enforcement enforced the status quo, a status quo that
was often brutally unfair to disfavored groups. . . . [R]esearch points to the widespread existence of
unconscious [racial bias.]”); Jesse McKinley, Pat Robertson Says Marijuana Use Should be Legal, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 7, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/08/us/pat-robertson-backs-legalizingmarijuana.html [http://perma.cc/L79Z-3X3T] (evangelical leader Pat Robertson advocating for
drug law revision, stating, “It’s completely out of control . . . prisons are being overcrowded with
juvenile offenders having to do with drugs. And the penalties, the maximums, some of them could
get 10 years for possession of a joint of marijuana. It makes no sense at all”).
247. See The Growth of the U.S. Deportation Machine, IMMIGR. POL’Y CTR. fig. 2 (Apr. 9, 2014), http://ww
w.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/growth-us-deportation-machine [http://perma.cc/NC5C-XEL
7] (graph of U.S. Border Patrol Budget, FY 1993–2013); see also Graff, supra note 151 (examining
the increase of Border Patrol budgets in comparison to the combined budgets of the FBI, ATF,
DEA, Secret Service and U.S. Marshals).
248. Editorial, Mr. Obama Feels the Heat, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/0
3/15/opinion/mr-obama-feels-the-heat.html [http://perma.cc/XR25-ZNA2] (“An escalating
campaign by immigration advocates against President Obama’s get-tough policies (nearly two
million deportations and counting) is having an effect on the deporter in chief.”).
249. See Eyder Peralta, National Council of La Raza Dubs Obama ‘Deporter-in-Chief’, NPR (Mar. 4, 2014),
http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2014/03/04/285907255/national-council-of-la-raza-dubs-o
bama-deporter-in-chief [http://perma.cc/4CJS-B5UD].
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Possibly hoping to relieve public pressure against deportations, the Executive acted, announcing the November 2014 Immigration Accountability Executive
Actions. In this context, the November 2014 announcement can be seen as the
President’s best effort to fix some of what is considered broken in the immigration
system.250 Nevertheless, even as the expansion of DACA and creation of DAPA
indicate a rejection of an indiscriminate deportation strategy, the massive underlying mechanisms of immigration enforcement survive in both new and refined
forms.251 These forms include the creation of new criminal alien categories like
the significant misdemeanor,252 the rebranding of S-Comm into PEP,253 and the
addition to the IDENT database of all of those who apply for DAPA or expanded
DACA.254 The broad powers of the immigration enforcement apparatus remain
intact, and their differential impacts on the “criminal alien” remain unchanged.255
While the Executive Actions did expand the population of immigrants who may
be protected from deportation, the three Memos examined in the preceding sections may have the effect of widening the nets of social control over the noncitizen
population.
Net widening is a phenomenon associated with forms of penal reform that
function to expand state control over an ever-growing criminal justice population.256 “The criminal justice system can be conceptualized as a net or series of nets
functioning to regulate and control personal behavior. Each component of the
justice system . . . is authorized by the state to intervene in our personal lives.”257
The term net widening has been applied where the reformers’ intentions are frustrated by the unintended consequences of widening, strengthening, or creating

250. See President Barack Obama, supra note 2 (“But today, our immigration system is broken—and

251.

252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

257.

everybody knows it . . . When I took office, I committed to fixing this broken immigration system . . .
[T]here are actions I have the legal authority to take as President—the same kinds of actions taken
by Democratic and Republican presidents before me—that will help make our immigration system
more fair and more just. Tonight I am announcing those actions.”).
See Natapoff, supra note 64, at 1104 (arguing that decriminalization alters and strengthens the penal
system’s powers of governance and control and concluding that “by rejecting the overtly punitive and
costly policies of mass incarceration, it permits the massive underlying mechanism to survive in new
forms”).
See discussion supra Part I.A.
See discussion supra Part I.B.
See discussion supra Part I.C.
Natapoff, supra note 64, at 1104.
See Austin & Krisberg, supra note 31, at 169 (“The criminal justice system can be conceptualized as a
net or series of nets functioning to regulate and control personal behavior. Each component of the
justice system . . . is authorized by the state to intervene . . . .”). In the following sections, this Author
will apply the concept of net widening to the immigration context.
Id. at 169.
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new nets of social control.258 As explained by James Austin and Barry Krisberg
in their formative article on the topic, (i) reforms that increase the number of
subgroups in society whose behavior is regulated and controlled by the state create wider nets; (ii) reforms that increase the state’s capacity to control individuals
through intensifying state intervention create stronger nets; and (iii) reforms that
transfer intervention authority from one agency or control system to another create new nets.259 While the net widening critique was originally developed in the
penal reform context, applying it to the immigration Executive Actions offers
valuable insights and suggests new directions for future reform efforts.
A.

The Executive Actions Create Wider Nets

The creation and consolidation of the significant misdemeanor category
creates wider nets by expanding the pool of people who are properly labeled criminal aliens. As discussed in Part I.B, supra, DUIs already constituted the most
common criminal conviction for deportees (after the immigration crime of illegal
entry). The explicit inclusion of the DUI as a significant misdemeanor nonetheless constitutes a form of net widening, as the immigration enforcement system is
now expanding in name to reflect—and continue to justify—the expansion in
practice. Individuals with DUI convictions and other misdemeanor convictions
will continue to be identified through the criminal system and transferred to detention centers. The consolidation of the significant misdemeanor transforms
the action of driving while intoxicated into an identity (“criminal alien”). The
consequence is that noncitizens with a single DUI conviction will continue to
face the full force of the detention and deportation apparatus.
Apart from the expansion of categories in the Priorities Memo, the expanded biometric capture required as part of DAPA and expanded DACA implementation can also be theorized as creating wider nets. DAPA and expanded
DACA would create a new entry point for the IDENT database, as discussed in
Part I.C, supra.260 These wider nets are part of what immigration scholar Anil
Kalhan describes as “immigration panopticism,”
258. Id. at 176–77 (analyzing partial decriminalization movements in marijuana laws creating

correspondent increases in other areas of law enforcement such as narcotics offenses); see also
Natapoff, supra note 64, at 1095 (arguing that decriminalization efforts such as drug courts and other
partial decriminalization programs actually widen the criminal justice net by increasing “the numbers
of offenders routed into the criminal system”).
259. See Austin & Krisberg, supra note 31, at 170.
260. See Privacy Impact Assessment Update for the Customer Identity Verification (CIV) System, U.S. DEP’T.
OF HOMELAND SEC. 3 (Apr. 26, 2010), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_
pia_uscis_civupdate.pdf [http://perma.cc/C3GR-2LQQ] (detailing the background fingerprintcheck procedure); see also Privacy Impact Assessment for the Automated Biometric Identification System
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which eliminates zones in society where immigration status is invisible
and irrelevant and puts large numbers of public and private actors—
including law enforcement and criminal justice officials . . . in the position of monitoring and determining immigration status, identifying
potential immigration law violators, collecting personal information
from those individuals, and informing federal authorities.261

Many DAPA and expanded DACA applicants will have thus far managed
to avoid capture by the immigration authorities.262 If the programs move forward, with no better options in sight, DAPA and expanded DACA applicants
will willingly submit their biometrics information to DHS, signing up for heightened surveillance by immigration enforcement agencies.263 While deferred action
may be a signal that the President is rejecting the fiscal and human cost of indiscriminate deportations, it maintains mechanisms of tracking, labeling, and control over a disfavored population (noncitizens) over the long term.
Whether the information in IDENT is used for a future mass deportation
program, or simply for the current person-by-person arrest of those noncitizens
who come into contact with the criminal system, the addition of millions of
previously uncounted migrants into IDENT widens nets by increasing the state’s
capacity to control migrants. Because IDENT contains the information of everyone who has come into contact with DHS’s immigration branches, it cannot be
said to be a criminal database.264 This distinction may be considered meaningless,
as inclusion in IDENT, because of its full integration into local criminal enforcement efforts, marks everyone in the database as a potential “criminal alien,” and
thus a potential subject of immigration enforcement.265 Because those who go on
to become Lawful Permanent Residents nonetheless remain in IDENT, the database’s reach extends far into the future, marking anyone who has ever been a
noncitizen as a potential candidate for detention or deportation. For those whose

261.
262.

263.
264.
265.

(IDENT), U.S. DEP’T. OF HOMELAND SEC. 2 (Dec. 7, 2012), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default
/files/publications/privacy/PIAs/privacy_pia_usvisit_ident_appendixj_jan2013.pdf [http://perma.
cc/WXL9-VYUU] (detailing procedure for IDENT checks).
Kalhan, supra note 117, at 1145.
Approximately 6.7 million unauthorized migrants in the United States are thought to have entered
the United States without inspection by immigration authorities. While some percentage of these
individuals may have had at least one encounter with border authorities or other agents of DHS,
many will have avoided all contact with immigration authorities. See Motomura, supra note 241, at
1828.
As explained in Part I.C, submitting biometrics information is part of the application process for
DAPA and expanded DACA.
For an explanation of IDENT procedures, see generally Privacy Impact Assessment for the Automated
Biometric Identification System (IDENT), supra note 238.
See Secure Communities: Monthly Statistics Through August 31, 2014 IDENT/IAFIS Interoperability,
supra note 240.
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data is held in IDENT, only attaining U.S. citizenship (and the protection from
deportation citizenship offers) erases the potential for detention and deportation.
B.

The Executive Actions Create Stronger Nets

The Executive has repeatedly made it clear that DAPA and expanded
DACA would not grant recipients lawful status; it merely deprioritizes them for
deportation.266 In this sense, for those who receive deferred action, this decriminalization in ICE’s eyes is in some way a tradeoff for their continued unlawful
status. In other words, by applying for deferred action, unauthorized migrants
make themselves known to immigration authorities without suffering the usual
outcomes of detention and deportation, and successful applicants are diverted into
the three-year period of DAPA or expanded DACA.267
This tradeoff in the form of DAPA and expanded DAPA may have a
net-widening effect by increasing immigration enforcement against other
populations. In the criminal realm, initial attempts to decriminalize marijuana
were criticized as having the effect of “widening and toughening the net in
other areas of law enforcement,” leading to increased arrest of persons committing other drug-related offenses.268 In the immigration realm, the removal
of DAPA and expanded DACA recipients as short-term enforcement priorities could also lead to the “widening and toughening” of the net in other areas
of immigration enforcement, providing political cover for the expansion in the
use of detention and border enforcement resources.269
An example of how this net widening of targeted migrant populations could
occur takes place in the family detention context. Since 2007, the congressional
budget has included a mandate that 34,000 immigration detention beds be funded

266. See Deferred Action Memo, supra note 30, at 5 (“This memorandum confers no substantive right,

immigration status, or pathway to citizenship.”); see also Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood
Arrivals (DACA), supra note 38 (“Deferred action is a use of prosecutorial discretion to defer removal
action against an individual for a certain period of time. Deferred action does not provide lawful
status.”).
267. Other ways of theorizing the spectrum of non-U.S. citizenship statuses include “twilight status”
and “liminal status.” See David A. Martin, Twilight Statuses: A Closer Examination of the
Unauthorized Population, MIGRATION POLICY INST. (2005), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/
pubs/MPI_PB_6.05.pdf [http://perma.cc/E99F-GGL4] (categorizing the various statuses of
the undocumented population); see also Jennifer M. Chacón, Immigration Detention: No Turning
Back?, in S. ATLANTIC Q. 113:3 9 (Summer 2014) (discussing the vulnerability of noncitizens
who are in a “liminal status”).
268. Austin & Krisberg, supra note 31, at 177.
269. Id.
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on any given night.270 Anti-detention advocates refer to this funding mandate as
the “bed quota,” drawing attention to its absolute uniqueness; in no other realm
of the U.S. carceral state does an openly acknowledged incarceration quota exist,
much less dictate policy.271 The mandate continues in effect, and the Executive has
not challenged it, instead calling for an increase in the funding of detention beds in
the most recent budget.272 Family detention—the incarceration of migrant
mothers together with their children—constitutes the largest percentage of
the new detention beds.273 The protection from deportation that DAPA and expanded DACA would offer to migrants who arrived prior to January 2010 would
leave those who have arrived more recently, including the women and children
who continue to arrive, as prime targets for these stronger nets of immigration
enforcement in the form of family detention.274

270. See Ted Robbins, Little-Known Immigration Mandate Keeps Detention Beds Full, NPR (Nov. 19,

271.

272.

273.
274.

2013, 5:04 PM), http://www.npr.org/2013/11/19/245968601/little-known-immigration-mandatekeeps-detention-beds-full [http://perma.cc/7GCT-99W3] (“The mandate calls for filling 34,000
beds in some 250 facilities across the country, per day, with immigrant detainees.”); see also Nick
Miroff, Controversial Quota Drives Immigration Detention Boom, WASH. POST (Oct. 13, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/controversial-quota-drives-immigration-detentionboom/2013/10/13/09bb689e-214c-11e3-ad1a-1a919f2ed890_story.html [http://perma.cc/Y6C58J4S] (“The policy requires [ICE] to keep an average of 34,000 detainees per day in its custody, a
quota that has steadily risen since it was established in 2006.”).
See AILA’s Take on the Detention Bed Quota, AM. IMMIGR. LAWYER’S ASS’N (Apr. 2, 2014),
http://www.aila.org/infonet/ailas-take-on-the-detention-bed-quota [http://perma.cc/CC57-WS7
P] (comparing other federal and local law enforcement agency detention policies to conclude that the
ICE quota is “an aberration in law enforcement”); see also Eliminate the Detention Bed Quota, NAT’L
IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CTR., https://www.immigrantjustice.org/eliminate-detention-bed-quota
[https://perma.cc/87TU-RAMH] (last visited Jan. 5, 2016) (“No other law enforcement agency is
subject to a statutory quota on the number of individuals to hold in detention.”); End the
Immigration Detention Bed Quota, DETENTION WATCH NETWORK, http://www.detentionwatch
network.org/EndTheQuotaNarrative [https://web.archive.org/web/20150911015624/https://ww
w.immigrantjustice.org/eliminate-detention-bed-quota#.Vov1yvkrJhE] (last visited Jan. 5, 2016)
(“[N]o other law enforcement agency operates on a quota system.”).
See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR 2016 BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT
58–60 (2015), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2016/assets/budget.pdf
[http://perma.cc/SFQ3-86P8] (the 2016 budget will increase funding for “additional technology
and infrastructure, and expanding and enhancing intelligence and targeting capabilities,” as well as
increase “the acquisition and sustainment of technology and tactical infrastructure along U.S.
borders,” fund “recapitalization of aging non-intrusion inspection equipment and ports of entry,” and
fund Customs and Border Protection (CBP) “intelligence and targeting activities”); see also Carly
Perez, DWN Statement: Obama Budget Harms Immigrants by Funding Increased Detentions and
Monitoring #EndtheQuota #ExposeandClose, DETENTION WATCH NETWORK (Feb. 3, 2015), http
s://detentionwatchnetwork.wordpress.com/2015/02/03/dwn-statement-obama-budget-harmsimmigrants-by-funding-increased-detentions-and-monitoring-endthequota-exposeandclose
[https://perma.cc/7DD8-PGMQ] (the new budget will “[b]ring the total number of detention beds
to 34,040—40 beds above the congressionally-mandated detention bed quota.”).
See Perez, supra note 272.
Austin & Krisberg, supra note 31, at 169.
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The Executive Actions also cement the ongoing expansion of Border Patrol
resources, guaranteeing continued efforts to catch, detain, and remove those who
are either initially attempting to enter the United States or trying to return to their
families and communities post-deportation.275 As these examples demonstrate,
even as lack of lawful status would be decriminalized for some in the form of
DAPA and expanded DACA, the total required amount of immigration enforcement would remain the same or be exceeded and more vigorously directed
toward those who do not qualify for the deferred action programs. For those who
cannot be made right with the law, the Executive Actions promise a stronger net
in the form of bolstered mechanisms for their capture, detention, and deportation.
C.

The Executive Actions Create New Nets

Net widening scholars also critique reforms that create new nets in the criminal realm by transferring intervention authority from one agency or control system to another one, rather than replacing or radically altering existing
institutions.276 In the immigration context, this transfer of intervention authority
had already been moving from federal immigration authorities to local criminal
authorities, but the November 2014 Executive Actions bolstered this transfer.277
The S-Comm program, now replaced by PEP, is part of what immigration
scholar Hiroshi Motomura calls the “recent dramatic expansion of the state and
local role in bringing removable noncitizens into contact with federal enforcement.”278 With “criminal aliens” making up the largest percentage of removals,
ICE relies heavily on noncitizens’ contact with local law enforcement to serve as
the conduit to immigration detention and removal proceedings.279 Because most
noncitizens transferred to ICE custody will be placed into removal (deportation)
proceedings, ordered removed, and actually removed, Motomura posits that the
“discretion that matters” is the discretion by local law enforcement to arrest.280 As
275. See Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. on S. Border &

276.
277.
278.
279.
280.

Approaches Campaign, to R. Gil Kerlikowske, Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., Admiral
Paul F. Zukunft, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S.
Immigration & Customs Enf’t, Leon Rodriguez, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., W.
Craig Fugate, Adm’r, Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency & Alan D. Bersin, Acting Assistant Sec’y for
Policy (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_south
ern_border_campaign_plan.pdf [http://perma.cc/294C-3VC3] (extending previous programs by
commissioning three joint task forces incorporating U.S. Coast Guard, CBP, ICE, and USCIS).
See Austin & Krisberg, supra note 31, at 169.
Motomura, supra note 241, at 1858; see also Eagly, supra note 10.
Motomura, supra note 241, at 1858.
See Eagly, supra note 10, at 1128.
Motomura, supra note 241, at 1853 (“The chances are very high that removable noncitizens
arrested by federal officers will be put into civil removal, if not prosecuted criminally. Once put into
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Motomura explains, it is the “enforcement preferences and prejudices of state and
local gatekeepers” that dictate the initial arrests of noncitizens, in turn defining
which noncitizens end up deported.281
Federal authorities tend to unquestioningly rely on the validity of local arrests
and convictions, and this reliance tends to mask local law enforcement agents’ racial and ethnic preferences and prejudices (even as biases vary in severity from jurisdiction to jurisdiction).282 The very fact that a noncitizen’s introduction into the
immigration enforcement apparatus occurs through the criminal system automatically brands him a “criminal alien” for immigration purposes,283 a branding that
helps obscure any shortcomings in the process of criminal arrest and prosecution.284 Under the original S-Comm program, a local arrest was sufficient for
ICE to seek a noncitizen’s transfer. The new Secure Communities Memo has
clarified that only those noncitizens with convictions (not merely arrests) will be
priorities for transfer to immigration custody.285 The reality remains, however,
that convictions begin with arrests, and thus the “discretion that matters”286 continues to be the decision by local law enforcement to arrest. As a result, immigration enforcement authority experiences a de facto transfer from federal to local
hands, and local authorities choose who will be exposed to federal immigration
enforcement.
The Secure Communities Memo’s focus on convictions also consolidates
the transfer of immigration enforcement authority to a new set of actors: local
prosecutors.287 Particularly for those accused of misdemeanors (and who become an immigration enforcement priority as a result of these charges), this
transfer of power may prove less relevant, as arrests in the misdemeanor context

281.
282.
283.

284.
285.

286.
287.

civil removal, the chances are very high that they will be ordered and actually removed.”). For a
parallel discussion on how police officers’ discretion often determines outcomes in the misdemeanor
adjudication system, and the effects of this discretion, see supra notes 69–79 and accompanying text.
Motomura, supra note 241, at 1857.
Id.
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-11-187, CRIMINAL ALIEN STATISTICS:
INFORMATION ON INCARCERATIONS, ARRESTS, AND COSTS 6 (2011) (defining “criminal aliens”
as those noncitizens “who are residing in the United States legally or illegally and are convicted of a
crime.”).
For more discussion on how the harms of the immigration enforcement system are layered on top of
the harms of the misdemeanor adjudication system, see supra notes 80–86 and accompanying text.
Secure Communities Memo, supra note 29, at 2 (“ICE should only seek the transfer of an alien in
the custody of state or local law enforcement through the new program when the alien has been
convicted of an offense listed in Priority 1 (a), (c), (d), and (e) and Priority 2 (a) and (b) of the
November 20, 2014 [Priorities Memo], or when, in the judgment of an ICE Field Office Director,
the alien otherwise poses a danger to national security.”).
Motomura, supra note 241, at 1842.
Secure Communities Memo, supra note 29, at 2.
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translate into convictions at incredibly high rates.288 Nonetheless, ICE appears
to be leaving nothing to chance: As Ingrid Eagly has revealed, ICE provides officewide trainings to local criminal prosecutors in counties with high noncitizen
populations.289 The goal of these trainings is to have “local prosecutors properly
charge and plead their criminal cases to maximize ICE’s chance of obtaining
removal when desired.”290 With these trainings, ICE seeks to avoid “litigation
challenges,” in which “ICE is unable to secure removal or the process of doing so
is more cumbersome.”291 ICE retains the authority to detain and remove noncitizens but relies on local actors to arrest and prosecute in ways that will indelibly
mark a noncitizen as a “criminal alien.” The Secure Communities Memo thus
consolidates intervention authority in local jurisdictions, giving local police and
prosecutors the power to both create and shape the nets that capture noncitizens.
D. Disavowing Criminality Contributes to Net Widening
An immigration reform strategy premised on distancing immigrants from
criminality contributes to the net widening effects described in the above Subparts.
Pro-immigrant advocacy commonly pushes back on the criminalization of immigrants by claiming and asserting respectability for immigrants—that is, in order
to claim the right to be protected, immigrants are compelled to “discredit, disavow, and deny the ‘criminal’ and/or ‘illegal’ populations within their communities
to represent themselves fitting the ideals and standards of ‘respectability.’”292 In
this case, to make the argument against S-Comm and in favor of immigrant
rights, advocates represented immigrants “as worthy and deserving . . . and most
important[ly], as not criminal.”293 As Lisa Marie Cacho explains, “Unfortunately,
disavowing criminality or illegality does not challenge the logic of crime and punishment but actually strengthens, sustains, and substantiates it. This logic
leaves those who are most legally vulnerable in both communities with very few
288. See Natapoff, Misdemeanors, supra note 70, at 1328 (“Lacking evidentiary rigor and adversarial

289.

290.
291.
292.
293.

testing, it is a world in which a police officer’s bare decision to arrest can lead inexorably, and with
little scrutiny, to a guilty plea. It is, in other words, a world largely lacking in a scrutinized evidentiary
basis for guilt, and therefore one in which the risk of wrongful conviction is high.”).
See Eagly, supra note 10, at 1220 (“Within Los Angeles, Harris, and Maricopa Counties, ICE has
begun to tailor its approach to the peculiarities of local practice. In particular, public records requests
reveal that ICE has conducted office wide trainings of prosecutors in each of the three county-level
prosecution offices.”).
Id. at 1220.
Id. at 1221.
Cacho, supra note 25, at 199. According to Professor Lisa M. Cacho, “‘respectability’ functions as an
ideological shorthand for the values, ethics, and attributes of a person residing in the United States,
who deserves to be legally protected.” Id. at 198 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 199.
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allies.”294 With S-Comm, as with other aspects of immigration policy, the disavowal of migrant criminality allows a response that widens the net, redefining ever
more noncitizens as “criminal aliens” by crafting and consolidating new categories
like the significant misdemeanor. This pushes immigrants to perform ever more
difficult feats of respectability, forcing them to avoid all negative contact with
the criminal system, even when, particularly for low-income immigrants of color, such avoidance may prove systemically impossible.295 For those who register
for DAPA or expanded DACA, such a performance of respectability becomes
more important than ever, given the required addition of their biometric information to the immigration enforcement databases.
The deployment of innocence—one of the hallmarks of the disavowal of
criminality—in the efforts to argue for lawful status for immigrants who arrived
in the United States as children has been broadly analyzed and critiqued.296 Less
attention has been paid to the ways that innocence is used in the advocacy around
ending police-ICE collaborations. The arguments made against S-Comm, including those that demanded reforms to the program because it targeted the
wrong kind of immigrant, relied on a narrative of immigrants as guilty only of
working hard to provide for their nuclear families. The 2011 Immigration Policy
Center’s report on S-Comm exemplified this type of argument when it recommended that S-Comm “become a program that focuses solely on those immigrants who have been convicted of serious criminal offenses, or who have been
identified by law enforcement officials to pose a threat to national security or public safety.”297 This type of recommendation posits those without a criminal record
or with a minor criminal record as innocents or near innocents who should not be
swept up in an immigration apparatus that is viewed as targeting the wrong kind
of immigrant. This in turn requires the rejection of those who do face convictions
after arrests, as well as those who are arrested for more serious offenses.298

294. Id.
295. For the proposition that racial profiling uniquely contributes to arrests of noncitizens, see Carbado &

Harris, supra note 16 (comparing Terry v. Ohio and U.S. v. Brignoni-Ponce to conclude that racial
profiling is uniquely harmful when facilitated by civil immigration procedures).
296. See, e.g., Daysi Diaz-Strong, Christina Gómez, María E. Luna-Duarte, Erica R. Meiners, & Luvia
Valentin, Commentary: Organizing Tensions—From the Prison to the Military-Industrial Complex, 36
SOC. JUST. 73, 74 (2010) (“Strategies for legalization offered by the state and embraced by many
vulnerable communities, such as the DREAM Act, trade on tropes of ‘innocence’ and ‘merit,’ thus
reinforcing the idea that there are ‘real’ criminals and undeserving or guilty immigrants who should
legitimately be denied access to pathways for legalization.”).
297. Waslin, supra note 115, at 17.
298. Cacho, supra note 25, at 198 (With this type of argument, immigrants are “compelled to discredit,
disavow, and deny the ‘criminal’ and/or ‘illegal’ populations within their communities to re-present
themselves fitting the ideals and standards of ‘respectability.’”).
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Separate from but related to the discourses of innocence were the calls to reject S-Comm on the basis that the program supposedly threatened partnerships
between immigrant communities and local law enforcement.299 This line of advocacy also draws on the idea that immigrants are not criminals, but rather, innocents needing protection from the police. A coalition of immigrant rights’
groups advocating for the Trust Act in California, the bill that limited S-Comm’s
reach by limiting the use of ICE detainers,300 describes the need for the Trust
Act in the following way: “With TRUST, immigrant crime victims and witnesses will be able to come forward and cooperate with police without fear of
deportation. This will rebuild confidence in local law enforcement that’s been
badly damaged by the ‘Secure’ Communities or S-Comm deportation dragnet.”301
These sorts of statements draw on an image of a trusting relationship between
the police and immigrant communities of color that purportedly previously existed and that S-Comm has negatively impacted. The framing of the argument
against S-Comm as one for a need for restored trust between unauthorized migrant communities and the local police posits immigrants as those who are
served by the police, not those who are targeted by the police, and frames them
as respectable (non)citizens owed the state’s protection, not its sanction. There
is no doubt that knowledge of police-ICE collaboration renders encounters with
local police even more frightening for low-income unauthorized immigrants of
color. Given the history of racial profiling and overpolicing of people of color,
however, especially Black and Latino immigrants and queer and gender-nonconforming immigrants of color, the call to a return to a time of healthy relationships between police and communities may ring hollow for those who are targeted by the police whether or not ICE is collaborating with them.302
As described below, pushing for reforms that would focus enforcement
on so-called dangerous criminals instead of innocent immigrants exempts
299. See Waslin, supra note 115 (citing obstacles to community policing under S-Comm, which

promoted the view among immigrant communities that local law enforcement is associated with
immigration enforcement); see also Secure Communities, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/statefed/SecureCommunitiesJuly2012.pdf [http://perma.cc/3DD
5-HQ84] (last updated July 26, 2012) (“Opponents say [S-Comm] is detrimental to community
policing goals which rely on the trust and support of community members to protect public
safety.”); see also ICE’s “Secure Communities”: Washington State Communities Can’t Afford It, ONE
AM. (2011), https://www.weareoneamerica.org/sites/weareoneamerica.org/files/SComm%20Fact
%20Sheet%205%206%2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/3FLN-FWCB] (“‘Secure Communities’ hurts
community policing initiatives by eroding trust between communities and local law enforcement.”).
300. For an explanation of ICE detainers, see Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Secure
Communities (SC) Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), supra note 130.
301. CAL. TRUST ACT, http://www.catrustact.org [https://perma.cc/L29K-K5ZT] (last visited Jan. 5,
2016).
302. See Carbado & Harris, supra note 16.
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immigration enforcement practices from critique by making them isolatable to
so-called real immigrant criminality. This ends up shoring up both the criminal alien category and the problems with the criminal justice system itself.
1.

Disavowing Criminality Reinforces the “Criminal Alien” Category

By relying on discourses of innocence, anti–S-Comm advocates inadvertently encouraged the sort of expansion of the criminal alien category, as well as enforcement based on this category, that both the Priorities Memo and the Secure
Communities Memo promulgate. Advocates released reports and studies that
tracked ICE’s removal statistics and argued that many of those removed did not
fall into the criminal alien category, but in doing so, these reports and studies
reinforced the category as a viable and meaningful one.303 ICE’s expansion of
the definition of “criminal alien” to include more categories of crimes is perversely sensible when viewed in light of this advocacy. If the public relations
problem with S-Comm includes the targeting of innocents or nearly innocents,
then it is a logical response for DHS to clarify and codify immigrants whose
criminal record consists of a DUI—one of the largest groups deported in recent
years, and whom advocates posit as nearly innocents—as priority “criminal aliens.”304 This redefinition of an arguably innocent category into a categorically
criminal one is precisely what occurred with the Secure Communities Memo.
Beyond merely broadening the criminal alien category, the Secure Communities Memo, like much of the 2014 Executive Actions, reinforced “criminal” as a category suitable for highly targeted and aggressive immigration
enforcement efforts. ICE will continue to gather the biometrics information of
all noncitizens (and citizens, for that matter) at the point of arrest and will be
able to act upon that information at their discretion.305 If ICE continues to target those who are arrested but not convicted, advocates may rightly continue to
point out that ICE is not following its own directives. Every time advocates do
this, however, they will be reinforcing the legitimacy of an immigration enforcement apparatus organized around a merger with the criminal justice system by engaging with the logic that a negative outcome for an immigrant in the
criminal system (a conviction) is sufficient reason to detain and deport him.
Ultimately, PEP represents a refined form of S-Comm: By clarifying that those
subject to the program are truly criminal by ICE’s expanded definition, the
303. See Waslin, supra note 115.
304. See ICE Deportations: Gender, Age, and Country of Citizenship, supra note 76, at tbl.5 (citing that

deportations for DUI numbered 32,463 in 2012 and 29,852 in 2013).
305. Secure Communities Memo, supra note 29, at 2.
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program is rendered less vulnerable to the advocacy efforts that rely on drawing
a distinction between “innocent immigrants” and “criminal aliens.”
By abandoning, at least in name, the overt rhetoric of creating secure
communities but still relying heavily on the rhetoric of criminality that makes
certain individuals a priority for enforcement, the new PEP makes it even more
difficult to get at the underlying logics that can transform “innocent immigrants” into “criminal aliens.” Namely, the factors that contribute to an “innocent immigrant” becoming a “criminal alien”—race, class, gender, and local
policing practices, to name a few—are rendered invisible by ICE’s restated and
refined focus on priority “criminal aliens” who have already been convicted.
The ease by which an innocent immigrant can be transformed into a priority
“criminal alien” upon conviction, and thus find herself beyond the reach of
mainstream advocacy efforts, is also erased. Ultimately, both ICE’s efforts and
the respectability politics upon which they rely teach us how to abandon entire
categories of people and end up strengthening, sustaining, and substantiating
the logic of the criminal alien category.306
2.

Disavowing Criminality Shores Up the Criminal Justice System

The unprecedented size of the U.S. carceral machinery has made its way
into public consciousness. Across the political spectrum, calls have been growing for the shrinking of the currently incarcerated population.307 The killing of
Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, the killing of Eric Garner in New York
City, New York, and the resulting nationwide protests have drawn attention to
racially targeted policing and use of force.308 Yet, despite the connections between the immigration and criminal enforcement systems, the reforms that are
beginning to be considered for policing and incarceration in the United States
have not touched the immigration enforcement and detention apparatus. If
anything, narratives reinforcing immigrant criminality have become more

306. See Cacho, supra note 25.
307. See, e.g., Wesley Lowery, The Bipartisan Push for Criminal Justice Gets a Koch-Funded Boost,

WASH. POST (Feb. 19, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2015/02
/19/the-bipartisan-push-for-criminal-justice-gets-a-koch-funded-boost [http://perma.cc/CRJ7T8HK] (describing the launch of a new bipartisan coalition spanning from Tea Party Groups to
the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and Center for American Progress to fund criminal
justice reform).
308. See, e.g., J. David Goodman & Al Baker, Wave of Protests After Grand Jury Doesn’t Indict Officer in
Eric Garner Chokehold Case, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/04/nyr
egion/grand-jury-said-to-bring-no-charges-in-staten-island-chokehold-death-of-eric-garner.ht
ml [http://perma.cc/CF9D-6M8P] (highlighting protests throughout Washington, D.C., and
New York in response to the refusal to indict Officer Pantaleo).
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pervasive, as evinced by Obama’s repeated invocation of the “felons, not families” catchphrase.309
The announced reform to S-Comm whereby only those convicted will
be the focus of enforcement needs to be considered side-by-side with critiques of the criminal justice system. Criminal scholar Alexandra Natapoff’s
work, cited in Part I.A, supra, has catalogued the dangers in assuming that
misdemeanor convictions—the vast majority of criminal matters in the system, and the basis for many S-Comm referrals—actually correspond with
guilt.310 When anti–S-Comm advocates critiqued the program for sweeping
up those who are arrested and not just focusing on those convicted, the convictions themselves were assigned weight and legitimacy in the criminal system as reliable indicators of criminality for the immigration enforcement
system—legitimacy that they did not merit. Anti–S-Comm advocates’ call
for detainer reform on the basis of restoring trust between police and immigrant communities masked the fact that police carry out arrests for reasons
that have nothing to do with evidence and much to do with racial bias and
other factors.311
PEP, S-Comm’s replacement, relies on the legitimacy of the criminal
justice system, as “criminal aliens” are created by law enforcement and prosecutors through local practices. Believing in the potential effectiveness of PEP
requires trusting that every step in the criminal process—arrests, bond determinations, convictions (whether the result of a plea or a trial), and sentencing—is producing legitimate criminals for the immigration apparatus to detain
and remove. When advocates fight against S-Comm or PEP, and call for the
program to only go after those convicted and not those arrested, they are likewise evoking trust in the criminal process, and in the legitimacy of the population of prisoners it produces. At a time when the criminal justice system faces
a crisis of legitimacy, such a move is particularly problematic.

309. President Barack Obama, supra note 2; see also Nov. 21, 2014 Obama Remarks, supra note 24

(“[W]e’ll keep focusing enforcement resources on actual threats to our security. But that means
felons, not families.”).
310. See Natapoff, supra note 64, at 1064 (“Because the petty offense process rarely scrutinizes cases and
because nearly everyone pleads guilty, arrests convert easily—in some places automatically—into
convictions. In other words, getting arrested, particularly for a minor urban disorder offense, can be
tantamount to sustaining a criminal conviction.”).
311. Id. at 1064. (“Arrests for minor crimes are easily made with little or no evidentiary support. This is
especially true for urban quality-of-life offenses, which often take place in bulk as police strive to
control high-crime neighborhoods.”).
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EMBRACING THE “CRIMINAL ALIEN,” DISMANTLING THE
CARCERAL STATE

The Parts above have argued that rather than curb deportations, the
November 2014 Executive Actions will result in the total amount of enforcement
to either remain the same or increase. Biometric databases will label every
noncitizen as a potential “criminal alien,” and any noncitizen contact with local
law enforcement will continue to lead to potential immigration enforcement action. For noncitizens, behavior like drunk driving will serve to permanently alter
identity, turning an immigrant into a “criminal alien.” These harms are layered
on top of the shortcomings and dysfunctions of the criminal justice system, which
will remain unaddressed in the push to mark more noncitizens as “criminal aliens” and deport them on this basis.
The strategies for keeping immigrants out of the expanding criminal alien category (and thus curbing deportations) have proven unsuccessful. The
pro-immigrant advocacy that led to the announcement of Executive Actions—
labeling the President as “Deporter-in-Chief,”312 demanding deferred action for
all immigrants,313 and demanding an end to S-Comm314—ultimately resulted in a
refinement of immigration enforcement that protects one portion of the undocumented population even as it hypercriminalizes the rest. In this sense, the Executive Actions can be considered a “conservative response to a radical challenge.”315
The President’s “felons not families” rhetoric is only the most obvious symbol of
the inherently conservative nature of the changes.316
Advocacy that continues to distance immigrants from criminals as a response to the criminalization of myriad aspects of the civil immigration system will only lead to further refinements in enforcement such as those seen in
the Executive Actions. The transformation of the significant misdemeanor
into a priority category for deportation and the metamorphosis of S-Comm
into PEP only further clarify that appeals to the innocence and respectability
of immigrants will not stop and may, on the contrary, enable DHS’s push to

312. See Peralta, supra note 249.
313. See Reshma Shamasunder, Deferred Action for All: A Common-Sense Step to Honor Immigrants’

Contributions, HUFF. POST BLOG (Sept. 10, 2014, 7:22 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
reshma-shamasunder/deferred-action-for-all-a_b_5798562.html [http://perma.cc/VM34-SNR
R] (calling for an extension of deferred action to “all of California’s 2.6 million undocumented
residents—and to undocumented immigrants across the nation . . . .”).
314. See Alvarado, supra note 139 and accompanying text.
315. Natapoff, supra note 64, at 1109.
316. See Nov. 21, 2014 Obama Remarks, supra note 24.
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broaden and cement categories of migrant criminality.317 Reforms like those
proposed by the Executive Actions that ground their logic in immigrant criminality are fated to continue to expand and strengthen “criminal alien” as a suitable
marker of disposable immigrant lives.
To avoid future cycles of refinement and expansion of immigration enforcement efforts, a new direction is needed. The remainder of this Article offers
three proposals to guide scholarship and advocacy in order to curb detention and
deportation distributed along the lines of migrant criminality.
A.

Embrace and Defend the “Criminal Alien”

The criminalization of migration has reached the point where the de
facto position for unauthorized migrants, particularly the 6.7 million who entered without inspection, is that of “criminal alien” until proven otherwise.318
Because immigration enforcement practices center on detaining and deporting an ever-widening swath of people defined as “criminal aliens,” it seems
logical that scholars and advocates ought to push back by attacking the correlation between migration and criminality.319 However, instead of mounting a

317. For a full discussion of the Executive Actions’ changes, see supra Parts I.A and I.B.
318. Motomura, supra note 241, at 1828 (“[A]bout 6.7 million unauthorized migrants . . . are believed to

have entered without inspection at a port of entry.”); see also Eagly, supra note 10, at 1128 (finding
that the “deportation of ‘criminal aliens’ is now the driving force in American immigration
enforcement.”). Eagly is careful to point out that “not all noncitizens who are removed are
criminals.” Id. at 1128–29 n.9. This Article argues that the construction of immigrants as criminals
renders all noncitizens presumptive “criminal aliens” unless they can prove that they merit
prosecutorial discretion. The burden is on the noncitizen to prove worthiness, not on the immigration
enforcement system to prove criminality.
319. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Chacón, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control and National
Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827 (2007) (arguing that blurred boundaries between immigration
policy, crime control, and national security have improperly subsumed the original impetus for each
sector); see also Matthew T. Lee, Ramiro Martinez, Jr. & Richard Rosenfeld, Does Immigration
Increase Homicide? Negative Evidence from Three Border Cities, 42 SOC. Q. 559, 560, 571–74 (2001)
(concluding that there is no correlation between recent immigration and higher crime rates); Rubén
G. Rumbaut, Roberto G. Gonzales, Golnaz Komaie & Charlie V. Morgan, Debunking the Myth of
Immigrant Criminality: Imprisonment Among First-and Second-Generation Young Men, MIGRATION
POL’Y INST. (June 1, 2006), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/debunking-myth-immigrantcriminality-imprisonment-among-first-and-second-generation-young [http://perma.cc/7YGZ-JT
4G] (“Paradoxically, incarceration rates are lowest among immigrant young men, even among the
least educated and the least acculturated among them, but they increase sharply among the U.S. born
and acculturated second generation . . . .”); Rubén G. Rumbaut & Walter A. Ewing, The Myth of
Immigrant Criminality and the Paradox of Assimilation, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Feb. 21, 2007),
http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/special-reports/myth-immigrant-criminality-and-paradoxassimilation [http://perma.cc/EX59-WK4L] (“In fact, data from the census and other sources show
that for every ethnic group without exception, incarceration rates among young men are lowest for
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seemingly never-ending series of defenses against the myth of migrant criminality (the idea that immigration enforcement on the basis of the criminal alien category is justified in part by the criminal tendencies of noncitizens as a
group), scholars and advocates would do well to begin to mount an unabashed
defense of the “criminal alien.”320 Defending against migrant criminality on
the grounds that immigrants are not criminals merely invites immigration authorities to expand the category of the criminal alien, to justify the current
record levels of deportations. Reforms that move the power to punish, detain,
and deport around from one government actor or agency to another and justify the transfer on the basis of contact with the criminal system do the same.
Releasing the grip on narratives of deserving and undeserving immigrants and
mounting a full defense of the “criminal alien” would allow for more nuanced
advocacy and scholarship. A defense of the “criminal alien” should not be
based on the category being overbroad or on immigration being a civil, not a
criminal wrong. The category is too well established for those arguments to
result in broad-based pro-immigrant reforms. Instead, an embrace of the
“criminal alien” requires challenging the very formulation of the category and
revealing it as an unnatural classification for the distribution of the harms of
detention and deportation. It also requires a critique of the system that produces migrants—primarily poor migrants of color from the Global South—as
criminals.321
B.

Examine Immigration Enforcement Within the Totality of the U.S.
Criminal Justice System

Instead of exceptionalizing the criminalization of immigrants, advocates
and scholars should practice engaging in what Dylan Rodriguez calls the “difficult praxis of conceptualizing immigration detention within the organic logic of
the totality of U.S. carceral state violence.”322 Scholars have already begun the

immigrants, even those who are the least educated. This holds true especially for the Mexicans,
Salvadorans, and Guatemalans who make up the bulk of the undocumented population.”).
320. This would admittedly be a departure from current practice. University of California Davis (UC
Davis) School of Law Dean Kevin R. Johnson points out that “the ‘criminal alien’ continues to be
one of the most reviled characters of all of U.S. law, with many enemies and extremely few political
friends (even among immigrant rights advocates).” Johnson, supra note 14, at 1607.
321. Kevin R. Johnson, Dean of UC Davis School of Law, summarizes the distribution of immigration
harms along the lines of race, class, and country of origin in The Intersection of Race and Class in U.S.
Immigration Law and Enforcement, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (2009).
322. Dylan Rodríguez, “I Would Wish Death on You…” Race, Gender, and Immigration in the Globality of the
U.S. Prison Regime, SCHOLAR & FEMINIST ONLINE (2008), http://www.ethnicstudies.ucr.edu/
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work of mapping out the ways in which immigration has been criminalized and
how aspects of the immigration system have been injected into the criminal
justice system.323 Scholars and advocates should go a step further and consistently conceptualize the totality of immigration enforcement practices, including
arrests, detentions, and exercises of prosecutorial discretion (such as deferred
action) within the framework of the criminal justice system.324
The anti-prison movement is gaining ground as the crises in the practices
of policing, processing, and incarcerating individuals come into ever-sharper relief.325 Immigration scholars and advocates avoid anti-prison and anti-police
brutality scholarship and social movements at their peril, given how immigration has been inextricably entwined with the criminal system. At best, this
omission risks defining the problems facing immigrants so narrowly as to produce reforms that change little and simultaneously reinforce migrant criminality.
At worst, it threatens to undermine anti-prison and anti-police brutality movements by bolstering the logic of criminality in general. Analyzing immigration

publications_media/rodriguez/SCHOLAR_AND_FEMINIST_ONLINE.pdf [http://perma.cc/
QSL6-YCH4].
323. The burgeoning “crimmigration” field has already begun this labor. The work of Juliet Stumpf,
Jennifer Chacón, César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, and many others has vastly expanded the
analysis of the growing links between the criminal and immigration systems. See, e.g., DANIEL
KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN HISTORY (2007); Jennifer
M. Chacón, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 135 (2009);
Ingrid V. Eagly, Local Immigration Prosecution: A Study of Arizona Before SB 1070, 58 UCLA L. REV.
1749 (2011); Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1281, 1281–83, 1353
fig.4 (2010); Daniel Kanstroom, Criminalizing the Undocumented: Ironic Boundaries of the PostSeptember 11th “Pale of Law,” 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 639, 654–55 (2004); see also García
Hernández, supra note 66; Legomsky, supra note 12; Miller, supra note 13; Stumpf, supra note 57.
324. The work of Ingrid Eagly, Jason Cade, and Hiroshi Motomura exemplifies this approach. See, e.g.,
Cade, supra note 75; Eagly, supra note 10; Motomura, supra note 241.
325. The recent announcement of a partnership between the right-leaning Koch Brothers and leftleaning George Soros, among others, illustrates this trend. See Carl Hulse, Unlikely Cause Unites the
Left and the Right: Justice Reform, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/
19/us/politics/unlikely-cause-unites-the-left-and-the-right-justice-reform.html [http://perma.cc/D
5MH-R334]. While the momentum is growing, longtime anti-prison scholars and activists are
issuing warnings about the direction of criminal justice reform. See Ruth Gilmore, The Worrying
State of the Anti-Prison Movement, SOC. JUST. (Feb. 23, 2015), http://www.socialjusticejournal.org/?
p=2888 [http://perma.cc/5JHN-U3AP]. Whatever the direction of the movement, immigration
scholars and advocates, with few exceptions, have remained peripheral to it. One exception is the
New York-based Families for Freedom, an organization run by individuals directly affected by
deportation. See, e.g., Abraham Paulos, U.S. Criminal Deportations and the Future of Black
Immigrants, HUFF. POST BLOG (Feb. 26, 2015, 3:36 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/abraha
m-paulos/us-criminal-deportations-_b_6763282.html [http://perma.cc/3F7F-XFFT] (“[W]e may
question why is it that there exists a false distinction between criminal justice reform movement,
racial justice and immigrant rights despite that many of us suffer injustices through our lived
experiences as Black bodies. The domestic and global systems of oppression do not entertain such
distinctions and neither should we.”).
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enforcement within the context of the broader carceral state not only helps
expose the shortcomings in reform strategies that give further reach and
weight to the criminal alien category, but also helps provide an opening to
produce both scholarship and advocacy that generate viable alternatives to the
current criminal justice system.
C.

Assess Proposed Reforms by Whether They Bolster the Detention and
Deportation of “Criminal Aliens”

With any proposed reform on the immigration front (from a local campaign
to a new law to an expansion of the Executive Actions), scholars and advocates
must ask whether the reform increases harm against those labeled “criminal aliens.”326 This question must include an inquiry into whether the category of
criminal alien itself is expanded or reinforced by the suggested reform. A full
defense of the “criminal alien” demands this focus on how reforms impact the
most criminalized migrants in order to dismantle the harms distributed by the
criminal alien category. This requires flipping the usual script. Current advocacy and scholarship often argue for the worthy or not (yet) criminalized
immigrants to be spared the harms of detention and deportation, and to be
given a pathway to citizenship.327 The focus in this type of intervention seems
to be on placing immigrants on the documented side of the undocumenteddocumented divide.328 Advocacy and scholarship that prioritize a defense of
the “criminal alien” should instead aim to disturb the notion that immigrant
enforcement should be based on contact with the criminal system. This type
of advocacy’s focus should be to reduce the harms of criminality by interrupting and dismantling the mechanisms that lead to unauthorized migrants’ detention and deportation.329

326. For a full discussion on this guiding principle, see Angélica Cházaro, Beyond Respectability:

Dismantling the Harms of Illegality, 52 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 355 (2015).

327. See, e.g., Stephen W. Bender, Compassionate Immigration Reform, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 107, 122

(2010) (“Conditions such as learning English should be replaced by an unfettered pathway to
citizenship that aims to successfully and respectfully integrate undocumented immigrants into the
political, economic, and social fabric of our communities.”); see also Gilbert, supra note 35, at 310 (“If
DACA serves as a stepping stone to passage of the DREAM Act and comprehensive immigration
reform, then this bold assertion of Executive authority will have lasting impact.”); Johnson, supra
note 14, at 1621 (“For reasons of fairness, the legalization, or regularization of the immigration
status, of undocumented immigrants has long been a priority of the advocates of immigrants.”).
328. See Cházaro, supra note 326.
329. These mechanisms include local policing practices and programs like S-Comm.

662

63 UCLA L. REV. 594 (2016)

D. Embrace the “Criminal Alien” in Practice
Advocacy efforts to disarm the category of criminal alien, while nascent, have
begun. They emerged in the most unexpected of settings during the 2012 reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act. As part of the reauthorization,
Congress tried (and failed) to insert language expanding the aggravated felony category—which leads to almost guaranteed deportation—to include those persons
who had three or more DUI convictions.330 Domestic violence advocates, a group
usually characterized as willing partners of the criminal justice system, rejected expanding a criminal alien category in the name of protecting women from violence.331 They actively lobbied against the creation of a new DUI-based aggravated
felony, and in their congressional lobbying efforts presented talking points that rejected this development.332 This successful effort was surprising in part because it
pulled away from the role typically assigned to contemporary domestic violence
advocates.333 Their rejection of the expansion of the criminal alien category was
especially notable as a moment in which people who were invited to be part of the
expansion of the criminal justice system and its ties to the immigration system refused the invitation.
These efforts are also emerging organically from those who have the most to
lose—immigrants who are already imprisoned in detention centers. In March
2014, 1200 immigrants held in a Tacoma, Washington immigration detention

330. See S. REP. NO.112-153, at 35 (2012) (attempting to add habitual drunk driving to the list of

aggravated felonies for deportation in the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA)).
331. See, e.g., Oppose Grassley Amendment (MDM12037) to the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization

(S. 1925) Regarding Removal of Drunk Drivers, NAT’L CTR. ON DOMESTIC & SEXUAL VIOLENCE
(Feb. 17, 2012), http://www.ncdsv.org/images/NTFESDVAW_TalkingPointsVAWADrunkDriv
ingAmendment_2-17-2012.pdf [http://perma.cc/C6ZG-K85Q] (“Senator Grassley’s Amendment
to S. 1925, elevating a third drunk driving conviction to the status of an aggravated felony for the
purposes of immigration removal, does not belong in VAWA.”); see also National Sign-On Letter
Opposing Third DUI Resulting in an Aggravated Felony, AM. IMMIGR. LAWYERS ASS’N (Feb. 4,
2013), http://www.aila.org/advo-media/aila-correspondence/2013/let ter-opposing-third-dui-resul
ting-in-felony [http://perma.cc/RZF4-AZME] (urging Congress to reject Grassley’s amendment
to VAWA: “The amendment attempts to use VAWA as a back door to address other immigration
matters that are irrelevant to the focus of VAWA, thus threatening to undermine the integrity and
purpose of VAWA.”).
332. See Eliminate the Detention Bed Quota, supra note 271; National Sign-On Letter Opposing Third DUI
Resulting in an Aggravated Felony, supra note 331.
333. BETH RICHIE, ARRESTED JUSTICE: BLACK WOMEN, VIOLENCE, AND AMERICA'S PRISON
NATION 83 (2012) (describing the centrality of criminal justice strategies to the contemporary
domestic violence movement and explaining that “[t]he subsequent over-reliance on the criminal
legal system and law enforcement strategies, and on legal and legislative reform more broadly, as the
solutions to the problem of violence against women, solidified ultimately into one of the most
important dimensions of the anti-violence movement’s work . . . .”).
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center began a 56-day hunger strike.334 The group of hunger strikers included a
mix of long-time Lawful Permanent Residents with serious criminal records, recent arrivals seeking asylum, and long-term undocumented residents whose road
to detention had begun with a single DUI.335 They made broad-based demands,
from improvements in their conditions of confinement to an end to all deportations, all without drawing distinctions between their worthiness for such changes
on the basis of their respective criminal records.336 The detention facility encourages inmates to fear each other by color-coding their dress.337 At the time of the
hunger strike, detainees were dressed in blue, orange, or red depending on their
level of perceived dangerousness, based loosely on their criminal records. Their
housing also depends on their outfit color, with more purportedly dangerous detainees housed in separate sections of the prison.338 Despite these external impositions of alleged levels of criminality, long-time Lawful Permanent Residents stood
334. Alexis Krell, Hunger Strike at Tacoma’s Immigration Detention Center Enters Day 4, NEWS TRIBUNE

335.

336.

337.

338.

(Mar. 12, 2014), http://www.thenewstribune.com/2014/03/10/3089804/hunger-strike-at-tacomasimmigration.html [http://perma.cc/PG5J-NDXY] (documenting a hunger strike at the Northwest
Detention Center “in protest of deportations, in demand of better food, [and better] treatment by
guards and working conditions at the center.”).
See Alex Altman, Prison Hunger Strike Puts Spotlight on Immigration Detention, TIME (Mar. 17,
2014), http://time.com/27663/prison-hunger-strike-spotlights-on-immigration-detention [http://
perma.cc/XR2B-P7ZG] (In addition to an individual immigration detainee who protested his own
detention, hundreds of protestors who followed suit “in Tacoma were also reacting to the policy
known as mandatory detention, which often locks up offenders indefinitely. The policy was
expanded by a pair of laws passed in 1996 and strengthened by the Patriot Act after Sept. 11, 2001.
It requires that categories of non-U.S. citizens be imprisoned without evaluating the threat they may
pose, often without giving them a bond hearing.”); see also Kristen Millares Young, Migrant
Detainees at Washington State Centre Continue Protesting Conditions, GUARDIAN (Mar. 12, 2014),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/12/immigration-detainees-washington-statecenter-protest-conditions [http://perma.cc/PBG5-GLYD] (documenting family member protests
outside the gates of the Northwest Detention Facility in Tacoma, Washington).
See Max Blumenthal, Why Immigrant Detainees are Turning to Civil Disobedience, NATION (May 23,
2014), http://www.thenation.com/article/179987/why-immigrant-detainees-are-turning-civil-diso
bedience [http://perma.cc/G9JK-43E9] (“As the national media focused in on Tacoma, Mora
Villalpando and two local immigration lawyers attempted to initiate negotiations with ICE. Their
demands were drawn up by the hunger strikers: an end to the indefinite waits for hearings, the
solitary confinement regime, the medical deprivation and the callous and arbitrary separation of
families. Instead of negotiations, they were met with an iron-fisted crackdown.”).
Angélica Cházaro, Rolling Back the Tide: Challenging the Criminalization of Immigrants in Washington
State, 11 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 127, 134 (2012). Descriptions of detention center conditions
are based on Cházaro’s own observations. For more information about human rights issues at the
Northwest Detention Center, see SEATTLE U. SCH. OF LAW INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC,
VOICES FROM DETENTION: A REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS CONDITIONS AT THE
NORTHWEST DETENTION CENTER IN TACOMA 5 (2008), http://www.weareoneamerica.org/sit
es/default/files/OneAmerica_Detention_Report.pdf [http://perma.cc/HFR2-HXH4].
See ICE, ICE/DRO DETENTION STANDARD CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM at 3 (2008), http://
www.ice.gov/doclib/dro/detention-standards/pdf/classification_system.pdf. [http://perma.cc/XU6
U-65YA].
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side by side with recent arrivals, and those with criminal records stood by those
without, jointly facing solitary confinement and other threats to collectively and
collaboratively draw attention to their common conditions.339 Their refusal of the
invitations to abandon each other on the basis of their different levels of criminality provides an example for all pro-immigrant scholars and advocates.
Additionally, when examining immigration enforcement within the totality
of the criminal justice system, separate opportunities emerge. If advocates are interested in attacking the significant misdemeanor category and other categories
that lead to detention and deportation, then joining efforts may contribute greatly
to dismantling the jail-to-deportation pipeline for noncitizens. For example, advocates could collaborate to decriminalize property crimes and to recategorize drug
and alcohol use as part of public health crises rather than as reasons for arrest and
criminal prosecution. Likewise, advocacy efforts to end racist policing may be
more effective in curbing deportations than further refinements to the new version
of S-Comm, rebranded as PEP, as getting booked and fingerprinted by local police
is the first step on the road to detention and deportation. In sum, pro-immigrant
scholars and advocates must commit fully to efforts to address the excesses of the
criminal system. This only becomes possible if “criminal aliens” become a group to
rally around and defend, not a group to differentiate from and reject.
CONCLUSION
The specter of the “criminal alien” haunts all aspects of the November 2014
Immigration Executive Actions; the accepted tenet that immigration enforcement
should be distributed along the lines of migrant criminality leads to the criminal
alien category becoming ever broader, with more noncitizens subjected to the
harms of detention and deportation. At the same time, the criminal justice system—the same system that helps produce “criminal aliens” for the immigration
enforcement agencies—faces a crisis of legitimacy over both mass incarceration
and policing practices. Scholars and advocates interested in halting the unprecedented rates of immigrant detention and deportation should accept the opportunity offered by the crisis of legitimacy in the criminal justice system and create a
crisis for the “criminal alien” paradigm, rejecting a deportation regime premised
on migrant criminality. Only by rejecting the “criminal alien” paradigm will opportunities emerge to avoid future executive actions and legislative reforms that increase harm for unauthorized migrants.
339. See Interview with Sandy Restrepo, Attorney (01/15/2015) (regarding her representation of hunger-

striking detainees). This information is also based on the Author’s experience representing detainees
during the hunger strike, alongside attorney Sandy Restrepo.

